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THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL 
ANDTHEWTO 
OLIVETTE RIVERA- TORRES* 
Abstract: Just a few Yotes shy of entering into force, the Cartagena Pro-
tocol on Biosafety is poised to become the next multilateral environ-
mental agreement that has the potential to pit trade interests against en-
Yironmental concerns. Nevertheless, concerns over impending conflict 
with the \\'TO trade regime may be misplaced. A detailed analysis of the 
rights and obligations of the parties to the Protocol and the applicable 
\\'TO disciplines reYeals few instances of probable conflict. The United 
States, one of the largest exporters of LMOs, has not signed or ratified 
the Protocol. Thus, the determination that no conflict exists is of partic-
ular importance if the Protocol is to be effective in the likely scenario 
where the exporting country is not a party to the Protocol but both it 
and the importing country are members of the \\'TO. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol or Pro-
tocol),1 adopted in january 2000 as a supplementary agreement to the 
1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),2 
could soon become one of the first binding multilateral international 
agreements dealing specifically and exclusively with some of the chal-
lenges created by "modern biotechnology. "3 To date, the Biosafety 
* Olin~tte Rivera-Torres graduated from the University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras 
(BA, 1995; JD, 1998) and Han·ard Law School (LLM, 2002). She is currently Assistant 
Legal Counsel to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The author would 
like to thank Professor David Wirth for his insightful advice and encouragement through-
out the process of writing this article. She would like to extend particular gratitude to her 
husband, Hiram Melendez:Juarbe, for his helpful commentaries and constant support. 
1 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 
2000, 39 I.LM 1027 [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. I will use the terms "Biosafety Proto-
col" and "the Protocol" interchangeably throughout this article to refer to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
2 UN Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, June 5, 1992,31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD]. 
3 According to the Biosafety Protocol: 
"!\Iodern biotechnology" means the application of: 
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or 
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Protocol has been signed by 102 Countries and ratified by forty-six 
countries.4 The Protocol requires fifty ratifications before it can enter 
into force.5 
Among the various responsibilities imposed by the Biosafety Pro-
tocol on each contracting party, a significant number are affirmative 
obligations to regulate the transboundary movement of living 
modified organisms (LMOs).6 This incorporation of trade-related ob-
ligations has led to an ongoing debate as to whether the Biosafety 
Protocol will conflict with existing international trade agreements, in 
particular with the World Trade Organization (WT0) 7 and its subsidi-
ary agreements. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part I of this 
article, complicating the negotiation and delaying the adoption of the 
Biosafety Protocol was the process of agreeing upon the relation be-
tween the Protocol and the WTO agreements. The seemingly unsatis-
factory way of resolving this question in the Protocol's text, or more 
specifically in its preamble, has not aided in putting an end to the de-
bate. Many predict impending conflict, while some suggest that the 
possibility of conflict is perhaps being overstated.8 
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physio-
logical reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques 
used in traditional breeding and selection .... 
See Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3 ( i). 
4 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Signatures and Ratifications, at http://www. 
biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2003). 
5 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 37 ( 1). 
6 For the definition of an LMO see infra text accompanying note 51. 
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 194 7, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U .N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
8 See generally the following in which the authors have analyzed the Biosafety Protocol 
and have addressed the possibility of conflict: AARON Cos BEY & STAS BURGIEL, INTERNA· 
TIONAL INSTITUTE FoR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIO-
SAHTY: AN ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: AN IISD BRIEFING NoTE (2000), available at 
http:/ /iisdl.iisd.ca/pdf/biosafety.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); AARn GUPTA, FRAMING 
"BIOSAFETY" IN AN INTERNA"IlONAL CONTEXT: THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS 
(Harvard Univ., Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Global Envtl. Assessment Project eds., 1999) [here-
inafter FRAMING "BIOSAHTY"]; Aarti Gupta, Creating a Global Biosafety Regi111e, 2 Iwr'L. J. 
BIOTECH. 205 (2000) [hereinafter Creating a Global Biosafety Regi111e]; Thomas J. Schoen-
baum, International Trade in Living Modified Organis111s, in ENVIRONMENT, HuMAN RIGHTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 27 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); Thomas A. Cors, Biosafety 
and International Trade: Conflict or Convergencer, 2 lNT'L J. BIOTECH. 27 (2000); Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: ,1 Multilateral .1pproach to Regu-
late GMOs, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 689 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. 
Jackson eds., 2001); Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in Genetically Modified Organis111s 
and Multilateral Negotiations, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/1 (july 5, 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctncddl.en.pdf; Paul E. Hagen & John Barlow 
Weiner, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New Rules for International Trade in Living Modified 
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The expectation of conflict is fueled by the ongoing debate about 
the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and the \'\7'f0.9 This debate stems from the more general 
preoccupation that trade interests are not always compatible with en-
vironmental interests and vice versa. From the environmental per-
spective, the fear is that "the wro will decide that national (including 
local) and international measures to protect the environment are in-
consistent with the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 
(GATT)] ... and other WTO agreements, and will hold them invalid. "to 
In 1995, WTO members established a Committee on Trade and the 
Environment (CTE) charged with the consideration of various issues 
relating to the WTO and the environment. The first of these issues 
was, and still is, to address "the relationship between the provisions of 
the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental 
purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental 
agreements."11 The CTE meets regularly and, in 1996, issued a report 
with some very general recommendations. Little progress seems to 
have been made since then. To date, no measure taken pursuant to 
an MEA has been brought before the Appellate Body of the WTO. 
Organisms, 12 GEO. INT'L L. REv. 697 (2000); Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and 
Biosafety by Hbrld Tmdc Rules, 13 TuL. ENVTL. LJ 271 (2000); Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology 
and Intemational Law, 42 HARV. INT'L LJ. 47 (2001); Sabrina Safrin, Treaties in CoUision7 
The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. lNT'L L. 606 
(2002); Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, Tile Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 6 
ENV1L LJ. 577 (2000); Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol and 
the Mbrld Trade Organization: Can the Two Coexistr, 12 PACE lNT'L L. REV. 107 (2000); Brett 
Grosko, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict or Harmony7 An Analysis of the 
Biosafety Protoco~ G1\TT, and the liTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 
295 (2001); K. Mulongoy, Different Perceptions on the International Biosafety Protoco~ 31 BIO-
TECH. & DEv. 1\foNITOR 16 (1997), available at http:/ /www.biotech-monitor.nl/3106.htm 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2003); Deepa Badrinarayana, To Trade or Not to Trade ... , 32 Envtl. L. 
Rep. 10512 (2002). 
9 On the MEA/WfO debate see generally, Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution7, 26 ENVTL. LJ. 841 (1996); Edith Brown 
Weiss & John H. Jackson, The Framework for EnvironlllCnt and Tmdc Disputes, in REcoNCILING 
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supm note 8, at 1; P. K. RAo, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
AND 1.11E ENVIRONMENT (2000); KENNETH P. EWING & RICHARD G. TARASOFSKY, ThE 
"TRADE & ENVIRONMENT" AGENDA: SURVEY OF MAJOR ISSUES AND PROPOSALS: FROM MAR-
RAKESH TO SINGAPORE ( 1997); An nick Emmenegger Brunner, Conflicts Between International 
Trade and Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 4 ANN. SuRv. lNT'L & CoMP. L. 74 (1997); 
Kevin C. Kennedy, Why Multilateralism Matters in Resolving Trade-Environment Disputes, 7 
\<\'mt:NER L. SvMP.]. 31 (2001 ); Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to the WTOs Report on 
Trade and Environment, 14 ARiz.]. lNT'L & CoMP. L. 341 (1997) [hereinafter Critical Guide 
to WTO's Report]. 
to Weiss & Jackson, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
11 /d. at 25. 
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The Biosafety Protocol is a multilateral environmental agree-
ment, with the following stated objective: 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to 
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the 
safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms 
[LMOs] resulting from modern biotechnology that may 
have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to 1m-
man health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements.12 
Increased tension among various countries with regard to LMOs and 
LMO product trade has led some commentators to suggest that a 
measure instituted under the Biosafety Protocol might be the first 
case pitting an MEA against the trade disciplines upheld by the WTO 
and its subsidiary agreements.I3 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind some significant 
differences between the Biosafety Protocol and other possible MEA 
measures that have traditionally been the subject of analysis in the 
MEA/WTO debates. For example: 
1. The Biosafety Protocol does not ban trade with non-parties. 14 
2. The Protocol does not require countries to ban a product, al-
though admittedly, a country following the procedures laid out by 
the Protocol might determine the need for one.l5 
12 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1. 
13 See, e.g., Zarrilli, supra note 8, para. 75. 
14 Some treaties that ban trade with non-parties include: The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species; and the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazard-
ous Wastes. Weiss & Jackson, supra note 9, at 31. These treaties all include some sort of 
"escape hatch" which would allow for trade with non-parties under certain circumstances. 
/d. 
15 See Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 8, at 698-99. 
Unlike the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, and the Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, the Biosafety Protocol 
does not contain a provision requiring Parties to ban trade with non-parties 
/d. (emphasis omitted). 
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3. The Protocol does not require consideration of extra-jurisdictional 
environmental concerns; i.e. the Protocol only requires its parties 
to consider the direct effect an LMO may have on the party of im-
port's environment or ecosystem. 
4. Another distinction is that the object of regulation of the Protocol 
is not the environmental threat that may be caused by the produc-
tion process of LMOs; its concern is with the effects that the LMO 
itself may have upon the host or receiving environment,I6 
5. And finally, the trade measures required by the Protocol are di-
rectly related to the harms being averted. In other words, none of 
the measures prescribed by the Protocol are using trade measures 
or restrictions as indirect ways of gaining compliance with the ob-
jectives of the Protocol. 
These distinctions clarifY, at the outset, that the Biosafety Proto-
col does not contain many of the trade-related environmental meas-
mes that are typically viewed as creating conflict with the WTO. But 
this does not necessarily mean that there is no possibility of conflict 
between the rights and obligations created by the Biosafety Protocol 
and those created by the WTO. This possibility of conflict motivates 
this article. Siding with those commentators who have argued that the 
Protocol should present no particular conflict with the WTO agree-
ments,l7 this articles focuses on some issues that have not been duly 
addressed, while suggesting a framework for further analysis of this 
and other MEAs. 
Part I of this article will provide an introduction to the origin, 
negotiation, and approval of the Biosafety Protocol in order to pro-
vide a background from which the Protocol can be interpreted. Part 
II of this article will address the final text of the Protocol. Special at-
tention and interpretative suggestions will be given for those articles 
that could have an impact on trade. Part III will provide an overview 
of three vVTO agreements and the provisions of those agreements 
that have been singled-out as being in possible conflict with the Pro-
tocol. These agreements are: (1) the GATT;18 (2) the Technical Barri-
16 Sec Gaston & Abate, supra note 8, at 142-44 (arguing that what is being regulated by 
the Biosafety Protocol are the final product's characteristics and not the process and pro-
duction measures through which the LMO was created). 
17 Sec generally CharnoYitz, supra note 8; Bernasconi-Ostenvalder, supra note 8; Gaston 
& Abate, supra note 8; Cos BEY & BURGIEL, supra note 8. 
18 GATT, supra note 7, at 1154. The GATT 1947 and 1994 are available at the World 
Trade Organization website, http:/ /docsonline.wto.org(last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
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ers to Trade Agreement (TBT);19 and (3) the Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Agreement (SPS).20 Part IV introduces the framework for the 
analysis of conflict between the Biosafety Protocol and the vVTO. This 
framework's point of departure is a detailed analysis of the scope of 
each of the agreements.21 Finally, Part V will examine different actions 
that a party to the Protocol may take and review them against the 
rights and obligations of the different WTO agreements that may ap-
ply to such a party. Primarily, this analysis will be conducted assuming 
the importing party is a member of the WTO and a party to the Pro-
tocol and the exporting country is only a member of the WTO. Part 
VI details the scenario in which both countries are parties to both 
agreements. 
I. THE RoAD TO THE BIOSAFETY PRoTocoL22 
The advent of modern biotechnology has been characterized by 
conflicting images of its implications. Some consider it a source of 
unbound remedies to our most serious social ills: hunger and dis-
eases.23 Others believe modern biotechnology advances are steps to-
wards even further hunger and disease.24 Both sides can cite examples 
to support their views. 
19 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS oF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 18 l.L.M. 1079 (1979), available at 
http:/ I docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
2° Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 1 (1994), available at 
http:/ I docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
21 This framework builds upon the analysis conducted by Professor David Wirth in 
Trade Implications of the Basel Convention Amendment Banning North-South Trade in Hazardous 
Waste, 7 REv. EuR. CoMMUNITY AND INT'L ENVTL. L. 237 (1998). 
22 See generally Cos BEY & BuRGIEL, supra note 8; Gaston & Abate, supra note 8; Mulon-
goy, supra note 8; Cors, supra note 8; FRAMING "BIOSAFETY," supra note 8; Creating a Global 
Biosafety Regime, supra note 8; Zarrilli, supra note 8; Schweizer, supra note 8. :Most of these 
sources refer to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin produced by the International Institute for 
Scientific Development (IISD) covering many of the meetings leading to the approval of 
the Biosafety Protocol. These documents can be found at 
http:/ /www.iisd.ca/biodiv/excop/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
23 See generally Martina McGioughlin, Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Be Important to 
the Developing World, 2 AGBIO F. 163 (1999); C.S. Prakash, Feeding a "'l>rld of Six Billion, 2 
AGBIO F. 223 (1999). 
24 See generally Miguel A. Altieri & Peter Rosset, Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Not 
Ensure Food Security, Protect the Environment and Reduce Poverty in the Developing World, 2 AG-
Bm F. 155 (1999); Miguel A. Altieri & Peter Rosset, Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnol-
ogy Will Not Help the Developing World: A Response to McGloughlin, 2 AGBIO F. 226 (1999). 
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One of the environmental concerns arising from these new tech-
nologies was based on the fact that, while many developed countries 
have regulatory infrastructures that allow them to experiment and 
produce modified or new organisms under relatively safe conditions, 
most poor or developing nations-characterized by limited techno-
logical and scientific infrastructure-lack national regulations, poli-
cies, and procedures to guide their involvement with the new prod-
ucts of biotechnology. This situation, coupled with the fact that many 
developing countries provide valuable genetic resources and host 
critical centers of biological diversity, created the fear that products of 
modern biotechnology could have a negative impact on these re-
sources if left unregulated. 25 
In 1992, a growing concern for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity led to the establishment of the CBD. Many develop-
ing countries believed that it was under the auspices of this Conven-
tion that these safety concerns with biotechnology should be ad-
dressed. 
A. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
The CBD was negotiated during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro. 26 Biodiversity was defined by the Convention as "the vari-
ability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within spe-
cies, between species and of ecosystems."27 
The CBD was agreed upon by almost every country in the world 
and currently, 186 countries are parties to the Convention.28 A nota-
ble exception is the United States which, although a signatory and 
25 For a list of some of the concerns that ha\'e been voiced regarding the risks that bio-
technology products could present to biodiversity, see Vicente Paolo B. Yu III, Compatibility 
of GMO Import Ref5Ulations with nTO Rules, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND ThADE, 
supra note 8, at 575, 582-85. See also SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, GLOBAL BIODIVERSI'JY OUTLOOK 67 (2001), available at http:/ /www.biodiv.org/ 
doc/ publications/ gbo/ gbo-ch-01-en. pdf. 
26 SECRETARIAT 0•· lHE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSI'JY, SUSTAINING LIFE ON 
EARlll: How 'Il!E CoNVEN'IlON ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrJY PROMOTES NATURE AND Hu-
MAN WELL-BEING 2 (2000), available at http:/ /www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sus-
tain-en. pdf. 
27 CBD, supra note 2, art. 2. 
28 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Divcrsity/Cartagcna Protocol on Biosafcty, at http:/ /www.biodiv.org/world/parties. 
asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2003). 
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active participant in its creation, has yet to ratifY it.29 Although in Rio 
de Janeiro there was no consensus on the need for a Biosafety Proto-
col, the CBD did achieve the inclusion of Article 19 (3), directing the 
parties to contemplate the need for such a protocol.30 Article 19(3) 
specifically provides that: 
[t]he parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a 
protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in 
particular, advanced informed agreement, in the field of the 
safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organ-
ism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse ef-
fect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological di-
versity. 
The specific language used in Article 19(3) reflects the preliminary 
compromises made by the participants to the CBD regarding three 
main issues. One commentator has referred to these issues and their 
impact on framing the ensuing negotiations: 
These three issues were, first and foremost, the primary and 
highly contested question about whether GMO's posed 
unique risks at all, and thus needed to be singled out for at-
tention; second, whether "prior informed consent" was the 
appropriate transnational governance mechanism in this 
realm, and third, whether the Convention on Biological Di-
versity was the appropriate transnational forum within which 
to pursue this discussion, and if so, which aspects of GMO 
risks were appropriate to address within this forum.31 
Regarding the first of these issues, the United States attempted to 
convince other nations that there was nothing unique in genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) that merited singling them out for spe-
cial treatment as opposed to organisms modified through more tradi-
tional breeding methods.32 U.S. delegates insisted that there was no 
29 There are no signs this fact will change any time soon. It is also interesting to note 
that the commitment to promulgate a Biosafety Protocol is one of the reasons put forth for 
the United States not signing the CBD. See HENRY I. MILLER, Is THE BIOIHVERSITY TREA'IY 
A BUREAUCRATIC TIME BoMB? 2-6 (1995). 
30 See Zarrilli, supra note 8, para. 60 (stating that the proposal for provisions dealing 
with the safe transfer, handling, and use of LMOs was already being discussed during the 
negotiations of the CBD but "there was neither time nor a wholehearted willingness to ... 
include them into the Convention .... "); see also Cors, supra note 8, at 29. 
31 fRAMING "BtoSAFE'IY," supra note 8, at 4. 
32 Creating a Global Biosafety Regime, supra note 8, at 208. 
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scientifically-based evidence to support the proposition that GMOs 
represented exceptional ecological or health-related dangers.33 Yet, an 
increasing number of European nations were legislating protective 
measures regarding GMOs.34 In an attempt to reach middle ground, 
the United States introduced the concept "LMOs" as a substitute for 
GMOs. This was an effort to divert the focus away from the genetically 
engineered aspect of the organisms and toward the fact that they were 
living organ isms. 35 
The second issue addressed during the Rio de Janeiro meeting 
had to do with the concept of "prior informed consent" (PIC), a term 
already in use in the Basel Convention on hazardous wastes and 
chemicals. Events like the one in 1986, where a U .S.-man ufactured, 
genetically altered, rabies vaccine was tested on a farm in Argentina 
without knowledge or consent of the government, prompted develop-
ing countries to demand PIC on this type of activity.36 Not being able 
to garner support against this demand for informed consent and to at 
least play down the association between PIC and the management of 
hazardous waste, the United States proposed the alternative language 
of "advanced informed agreement" (A.IA).37 
The third issue had to do with the reasons that justified placing 
"biosafety"38 concerns within the scope of the CBD, which would 
define the scope of a Biosafety Protocol under its auspices. Partici-
pants in the Rio de Janeiro meeting seemed to agree that certain 
transboundary transfers of LMOs could result in adverse effects on 
biodiversity. The issue was thus whether to limit the scope or to 
broaden it to include other potential adverse impacts, such as those to 
human health, through the use of LMOs in foods and medications.39 
Most developed countries argued that concerns outside the concept 
of biodiversity, such as those of human health, were already addressed 
by other international organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and, from the trade perspective, by the SPS.40 
Significantly, the resulting mandate in Article 19 (3) refers to the "ad-
33Jd. 
34Jd. 
35 !d. 
36 FRAMING "BIOSAFE'IY," supra note 8, at 6. 
3i !d.; Creating a Global Biosafety Regime. supra note 8, at 208-09. 
38 Biosafety has been commonly defined as the "safe use of biotechnology." Creating a 
Global Biosafet_v Regime. supra note 8, at 206. 
39 FRAMING "BIOSAfTIY," supra note 8, at 7. 
40 !d. 
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verse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological di-
versity" and nothing more. 
Thus, having defined the issues from GMOs to LMOs, from PIC 
to AlA, and from a broader scope of biosafety to a biodiversity scope 
of biosafety, the developed countries, led by the United States, were 
able to frame the next round of dialogues leading to the Biosafety 
Protocol. 
B. Negotiating the Biosafety Protocol 
The Second Conference of the Parties (2nd COP) to the CBD, 
held in November 1995, agreed on the need for a Biosafety Proto-
col.41 The 2nd COP designated an Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Biosafety (BSWG) entrusted with drafting and negotiating 
a Biosafety Protocol.42 Throughout the years of negotiations there 
were three dominant groups: the Miami Group (Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Uruguay, and the United States, all of them producers 
of bioengineered products); the Like-Minded Group (the majority of 
developing countries, coming from the G-77 /China sector); and the 
European Union countries.43 At the Extraordinary Meeting of the Con-
ference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Ex-
COP), held in Cartagena in February 1999, significant divisions 
among the negotiating parties prevented consensus and blocked the 
adoption of a protocol. The persistent points of contention were: the 
scope of the Protocol, the relationships between the Protocol and 
other international agreements, and the issue of liability in the event 
that LMOs caused environmental damage.44 
Almost a year later, on January 29, 2000 in Montreal, 133 coun-
tries agreed to the Biosafety Protocol. Some analysts have suggested 
that governments and industry participants had been more willing to 
compromise this time in order to avoid another embarrassing failure 
like the WfO Ministerial Conference held in Seattle.45 In addition, 
during the months between Cartagena and Montreal there was grow-
41 Second Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Deci-
sion II/5: Consideration of a Need for Modalities of a Protocol for the Safe Transfer. Han-
dling and Use of Living Modified Organisms, UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19 (Nov. 1995), avail-
able at http:/ /www.biodiv.org/ decisions/ default.asp?1g=O&m=cop-02&d=05 (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2003). 
42 /d. 
43 FRAMING "BIOSAFETY," supra note 8, at 9. 
44 Schweizer, supra note 8, at 585-86. 
45 Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 298; Cos BEY & BuRGIEL, supra note 8, at 2. 
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ing concern in various countries regarding the risks of LMOs in agri-
culture, concerns that were also being heard in the United States.46 
National legislatures considered or implemented responses to these 
concerns.47 Some large multinational food companies also started to 
state their intention to use only non-genetically modified ingredients 
in their products.48 Thus, the idea of a harmonized procedure might 
have begun to sound more appealing to some exporting countries. 
II. A Close-Up Look at the Protocol 
The Biosafety Protocol has been referred to as a "compromise 
text, "49 and indeed this seems a fitting description of a text that took 
more than four years of intense negotiations to finalize. But how were 
the conflicts resolved, and what does the final compromise look like? 
In particular, what is the scope of the Protocol, and which of its obli-
gations have an impact on trade? 
In Article 4, the Protocol states: "This Protocol shall apply to the 
transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all living 
modified organisms that may have adverse effects on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to 
human health. "50 This Article reflects the different compromises 
made in the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol. Therefore, a review 
of each relevant element will be briefly addressed. 
The first significant aspect of the Article is its reference to LMOs. 
The Protocol describes LMOs as "any living organism that possesses a 
novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of 
modern biotechnology. "51 This definition is further narrowed in the 
Biosafety Protocol by the definition given to the concepts "living or-
ganism" and "modern biotechnology. "52 The first is defined as "any 
biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic mate-
rial, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids. "53 Modern bio-
technology is also restricted to the application of specific scientific 
procedures that have the purpose of overcoming "natural physiologi-
46 Creating a Global Biosafcty Regime, supra note 8, at 217-18. 
47 /d. at 218. 
48 /d. 
49 Zarrilli, supra note 8, para. 64. 
so Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. 4. 
51 /d. art. 3(g). 
52 /d. art. 3(h)-3(i). 
53 /d. art. 3(h). 
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cal reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not tech-
niques used in traditional breeding. "54 
An additional element to note is the exclusion from the scope of 
the Protocol of products derived from LMOs, or what was described 
during the negotiating process as "products thereof." Products made 
of, or derived from, LMOs include commodities, such as clothing 
made from genetically modified cotton, and many processed foods, 
such as tomato paste, cereals, and soybean oil. The fact that these 
products will not fall under the scope of the Protocol is important for 
several reasons: first, these commodities conform a significant per-
centage of the trade in LMO products, and second, many of the con-
troversies relating to the safety of LMOs and the desirability of them 
being labeled for consumer interest reasons, have revolved around 
these types ofproducts.55 
The second element in Article 4 that is significant to the Proto-
col's scope is the phrase: "may have adverse effects on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into ac-
count risks to human health." Although it is evident that the overall 
purpose of the Protocol is the protection of biological diversity, it is 
debatable whether the phrase, "taking also into account risks to hu-
man health," broadens its scope. 
The question, in other words, is whether a risk to human health 
can be referred to as an independent ground on which to base a 
measure under the Protocol. On one hand, it appears that nothing on 
its face would exclude this possibility, except perhaps for the modify-
ing word, "also. "56 Additionally, Article 2 (5) makes a stand-alone ref-
erence to the risks of human health. 57 On the other hand, the Proto-
col excluded from its scope-or, in certain cases, limited from its 
54 Id. art. 3(i). 
55 On the ongoing controversy of GMO product labeling see generally Mathew 
Franken, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better Labeling Standard for Genetically Modified Foods, 1 MINN. 
h<TELL. PROP. REv. 153, 158-59 (2000); Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modified 
Foods: Legal and Scientific Issues, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 717 (2000); Diane Thue-
Vasquez, Genetic Engineering and Food Labeling: A Continuing Controversy, 10 SAN joAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REv. 77 (2000); Lara Beth Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engi-
neered Food: How Sound Are the Analytical Frameworks Used by FDA and Food Producers 1, 54 FooD 
& DRUG LJ. 667 (1999). 
56 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4. 
57 Id. art. 2(5). Article 2(5) indicates that "the parties are encouraged to take into ac-
count, as appropriate, available expertise, instruments, and work undertaken in interna-
tional forums with competence in the area of risks to human health." Id. It is important to 
note that this might also be a recognition of the fact that there are other international 
forums with particular expertise and competence in the issue of human health. See id. 
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reach-those products that could not pose a direct risk to biodiversity. 
Thus, it could be persuasively argued that any coherent reading 
should interpret the phrase, "human health," within the context of 
the general scope of the Protocol, i.e. only human health risks inci-
dental to an identifiable risk to biodiversity.58 But, perhaps a third in-
terpretation could also be consistent with both limiting the scope to 
only those LMOs being introduced into the environment as well as 
giving independent meaning to the "human health" provisions. 59 This 
interpretation would permit consideration of human health risks 
which were incidental to the release of an organism into the envi-
ronment, i.e. from coming in contact with the LMO seed or from har-
vesting LMO plants, but would not cover human health risks related 
to the consumption of LMO food and food products. 
Few analyses have been put forward on the significance of this 
phrase. However, one commentator has stated that most of the nego-
tiating countries insisted that the phrase, "taking also into account 
risks to human health," should include only "indirect human health 
impacts that could arise as a result of direct impacts on biodiversity. "60 
For the purpose of this article, the phrase will be interpreted in the 
limited sense suggested by this commentator.61 As will be discussed in 
another section, the interpretation given to this phrase will have a 
significant impact in determining the Biosafety Protocol's relation to 
the vVTO agreements. 
There are three other limitations on the scope of the Protocol 
that must be considered. These are found in Articles 5, 6, and 7. 
Article 5 states: 
Notwithstanding Article 4 and wit.hout prejudice to any right 
of a Party to subject all living modified organisms to risk as-
sessment prior to the making of decisions on import, this 
Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for hu-
58 Id. art. 2(5). 
59 Id. 
60 Creating a Global Biosafety Regime, supra note 8, at 211. 
61 It must be pointed out that the fact that a risk to human health could or could not 
be addressed as an independent ground for a measure under the Biosafety Protocol would 
not impede a country from limiting the entrance of a product that in fact poses such a 
risk. 
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mans that are addressed by other relevant international agreements 
or organisations.62 
Although by some accounts of the negotiation's outcome, LMO 
pharmaceuticals were excluded from the application of the Protocol, 
their absolute exclusion is anything but clear.63 Article 5 could be rea-
sonably understood as excluding application of the Protocol only 
when other relevant international agreements or organizations cover 
the specific pharmaceutical.64 Other commentators have also noted 
that the Article refers solely to human pharmaceuticals.65 Thus, it 
would seem that veterinary pharmaceuticals, which satisfy the 
definition of LMOs,66 do fall under the Protocol's scope.67 Notwith-
standing the possibility of some pharmaceuticals falling under the 
scope of the Protocol, it is possible that they would still be excluded 
from the AlA procedure, which will be discussed below, under either 
Article 6(2) (intended for contained use) or Article 7(2) (intended 
for use as food, feed, or for processing). 
Articles 6 and 7 place certain limitations not on the scope of the 
Protocol itself, but on the application of certain features, particularly 
the AlA. These Articles basically state that: LMOs in transit,6B LMOs 
intended for "contained use"69 "undertaken in accordance with the 
standards of the Party of import,"70 LMOs "intended for direct use as 
food or feed or for processing" (LMO-FFPs),71 and "intentional trans-
62 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5 (emphasis added). 
55 Murphy, supra note 8, at 77. 
64 See id. The significance of this interpretation might be limited. But one can imagine, 
for example, an imported seed for a medicinally enhanced fruit, which, for its hybrid na-
ture (pharmaceutical/fruit), were not addressed by other international agreements. In 
this case, these seeds' impact on biodiversity should be analyzed under the Protocol's pro-
vision. 
65 Hagen & Weiner, supra note 8, at 702. 
65 See id. One could conceive, for example, feed in the form of seeds or grain engi-
neered to deliver medicinal benefits to animals falling under this category as long as the 
seeds are "living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained 
through the use of modern biotechnology." Id. art. 3(g). But if the seed in this example is 
grown elsewhere and intended to be used directly as seed the AlA procedure would still 
not apply. See id. 
67 Hagen & Weiner, supra note 8, at 702 n.28. 
68BiosafetyProtocol, supra note 1, art. 6(1). 
69 Id. art. 6(2)."'Contained use' means any operation, which undertaken within a facil-
ity, installation or other physical structure, which involves living modified organisms that 
are controlled by specific measures that effectively limit their contact with, and their im-
pact on, the external environment." ld. art. 3(b). 
7° Id. art. 6(2). 
71 I d. art. 7 (2). 
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boundary movement of living modified organisms identified in a de-
cision of the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Par-
ties to this Protocol as being not likely to have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into 
account risks to human health, "72 do not need to comply with the AlA 
procedure. 
Each of these exceptions to the AlA procedure does not entail 
exclusion from other aspects of the Biosafety Protocol. However, since 
the AlA procedure is the feature in this agreement that interacts with 
trade more pervasively, it is significant that LMO-FFPs, which com-
pose the majority of the actual trade in LMOs with products such as 
"modified corn, soya, wheat, rapeseeds, tomatoes and cotton,"73 are 
not included. 
Having examined the limitations upon the scope of the Protocol, 
this article will now analyze the obligations created by the Biosafety 
Protocol. 
The Biosafety Protocol imposes various obligations on its parties. 
Some of them are trade-related, but many of them are not. Some of 
the non-trade-related obligations are those found in Article 20, re-
garding information-sharing and the Biosafety Clearing-House, and 
Article 22, regarding capacity building.74 Other non-trade-related ob-
ligations imposed by the Protocol include: the obligation to provide 
notice when an unintentional transboundary movement of LMOs has 
taken place,75 the obligation to protect confidential information,76 the 
obligation to promote public awareness and participation with regard 
to LMOs,77 and the obligation to adopt appropriate measures to pre-
vent and handle illegal transboundary movement ofLMOs.78 
72 /d. art. 7(4). This provision would seem to have been included to attract LMO ex-
porting countries which could arguably manage exclusions for several of their products. 
73 Zarrilli, supra note 8, para. 69. 
74 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 20, 22. The Biosafety Clearing-House offers a 
mechanism for information sharing between countries providing the opportunity for ex-
change of scientific technical and environmental information that will aid an importing 
Country in its decision-making processes. /d. Capacity building, on the other hand, aims at 
more directly imprO\·ing a developing country's capacity to assess the desirability or poten-
tial hazards of importing an LMO, taking into consideration its own environmental and 
ecological realities. Both of these efforts by the Protocol should be seen as important con-
tribution primarily to developing countries if they are adequately carried out. /d. 
75 /d. art. 17. 
76 /d. art. 21. 
77 /d. art. 23. 
78 /d. art. 25. 
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Another set of obligations that merit particular attention are 
those found in Article 11, which refers to the procedures that must be 
followed with regard to LMO-FFPs.79 This Article permits each party 
to conduct its regulation with regard to both the import and domestic 
use of these products under its domestic regulatory framework. Article 
11 does not offer much in terms of the criteria on which a country 
must base its decision regarding domestic use. However, Article 2 of 
the Protocol is arguably applicable. This Article states that "[p] arties 
shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer and 
release, of any living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner 
that prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also 
in to account risks to human health. "80 Article 16, on risk manage-
ment, should also apply. This Article requires parties to "establish and 
maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to regu-
late, manage and control risks identified in the risk assessment provi-
sions of this Protocol associated with the use [and] handling ... of 
living modified organisms."81 Article 16 also states that each party 
should endeavor to ensure that LMOs that are locally developed un-
dergo an appropriate period of observation before they are put to 
their intended uses.82 These two Articles (Articles 2 and 16) seem to 
provide the only guidelines in the Protocol for the domestic develop-
ment, use, and releaseofLMO-FFPs. 
There are, however, specific requirements on a party to the Pro-
tocol that makes a decision regarding domestic use of an LMO as an 
FFP. The party must inform the Biosafety Clearing-House of its deci-
sion, accompanying such notification with a minimum of information 
as set out in Annex II of the Protocol.83 The information provided to 
the Clearing-House is of central importance. Based on this informa-
tion, the rest of the parties to the Protocol must proactively announce 
their determination as to the import of such products. Article 11 (4) 
does specify that the determination by the potential importing coun-
try must be consistent with the objective of the Protocol, adding in 
Article 11 (8) the first expressed reference to the controversial precau-
tionary principle, aside for the general reference in Article 1 relating 
to the objective of the Protocol. 
79 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 11. 
so !d. art. 2(2) (emphasis added). 
81 Id. art. 16(1). 
82 Id. art. 16(4). 
8!1 !d. Annex II(j). Annex II(j) of the Protocol specifically requires a risk assessment 
report consistent with Annex Ill. !d. Annex II(j). 
2003] The Biosafety Protocol and the TtTO 
Article 11 (8) states: 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant sci-
entific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism 
on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to 
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a de-
cision as appropriate, with regard to the import of that living 
modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed or 
for processing, in order to avoid or minimize such potential 
adverse effects.S4 
279 
Thus, this Article could have an effect on trade insofar as it re-
quires that the decision to permit an import of LMO-FFPs be consis-
tent with the objectives of the Protocol and in accordance with the 
precautionary principle. In fact, the only distinguishing aspect of this 
procedure from those required for other LMOs under the AlA is that 
it "lays first responsibility on potential importers to develop and an-
nounce [its] regulations proactively. "85 Consistent with its preoccupa-
tion concerning the lack of regulatory mechanisms in developing 
countries, Article 11 establishes a procedure for those countries that 
lack a domestic framework under which to make a decision regarding 
the import of LMO-FFPs. The procedure requires developing coun-
tries to declare through the Biosafety Clearing-House that, 
its decision prior to the first import of a living modified or-
ganism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for proc-
essing, on which information has been provided . . . [to the 
Clearing-House] ... will be taken according to ... a risk as-
sessment undertaken in accordance with Annex III; and ... 
a decision made within a predictable time frame not exceed-
ing two hundred and seventy days.86 
It seems clear that Article 11 does its best not to interfere with the lo-
cal regulatory frameworks, typically present in developed countries, 
which already deal with the sanitary standards applicable to both the 
local production and the importation of food and feed. At the same 
84 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. II (8). 
85 CosHY & BURGIF.L, supra note 8, at 8; sec also David J. Schnier, Genetically Modified 
Organisms & The Cartagena Protocol, 12 FoRDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 377, 4IO (200I ). 
86 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. II (6). 
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time, and being that LMOs intended for FFP are still living and thus 
without proper handling could be introduced into the environ-
ment,the Article provides a framework for those countries that do not 
have a regulatory system in place to deal with these novel products. 
Moving on to those obligations with a direct impact on the trade 
ofLMOs, the AlA procedure has been referred to as the "backbone"87 
or the "cornerstone"88 of the Protocol. Still, it appears that the proce-
dure is considerably restricted in its application to various LMOs.89 
Specifically, the AlA procedure is required only for those LMOs which 
are destined for direct introduction to the environment and which 
have not been excluded by any of the exceptions mentioned before.90 
Examples of such LMOs would be seeds for planting or fish for re-
lease into streams, among others.91 Compliance with the AlA proce-
dure is also only required for the first intentional transboundary 
movement of an LMQ.92 
The first thing the AlA procedure requires is for the party of ex-
port to notifY, in writing, the competent national authority of the 
party of import prior to the intentional transboundary movement of 
an LM0.93 This notification must, at a minimum, include the infor-
mation stated in Armex I of the Protocol, which includes information 
such as: the "[t]axonomic status, common name, point of collection 
or acquisition, and characteristics of recipient organism or parental 
organisms related to biosafety";94 the "[c) enters of origin and centers 
of genetic diversity, if known, of the recipient organism and/ or the 
parental organisms and a description of the habitats where the organ-
isms may persist or proliferate";95 the "[t]axonomic status, common 
name, point of collection or acquisition, and characteristics of the 
donor organism or organisms related to biosafety";96 the "[d]escrip-
tion of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced, the technique 
used, and the resulting characteristics of the living modified organ-
ism";97 the "[i]ntended use of the living modified organism or prod-
s7 Cos BEY & BuRGIEL, supra note 8, at 7. 
88 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 8, at 693. 
89 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. 7. 
90 !d. 
91 !d. 
92 !d. art. 7(3). 
93 !d. art. 8(I). 
94 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, Annex I( e). 
95 /d. Annex l(f). 
96 /d. Annex I(g). 
97 /d. Annex I(h). 
2003] The Biosajety Protocol and the WTO 281 
ucts thereof, namely, processed materials that are of living modified 
organism origin, containing detectable novel combinations of replic-
able genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotech-
nology,''98 and the "[r]egulatory status of the living modified organism 
within the State of export (for example, whether it is prohibited in 
the State of export, whether there are other restrictions, or whether it 
has been approved for general release) and, if the living modified or-
ganism is banned in the State of export, the reason or reasons for the 
ban."99 
Mter the notification is received by the importing party, Article 9 
requires acknowledgment of receipt of the notification.100 Article 10, 
in turn, establishes the decision procedure the importing state must 
follow, including certain limitations on the time a party may take be-
fore informing its decision which can be: (a) "approving the import, 
with or without conditions, including how the decision will apply to 
subsequent imports of the same living modified organism"; (b) "pro-
hibiting the import"; (c) "requesting additional relevant information 
in accordance with its domestic regulatory framework or Annex I 
.... ";or (d) "informing the notifier that the period specified [in Ar-
ticle 10(3)] is extended by a defined period of time."101 In all cases, 
except when consent is unconditional, the decision must "set out the 
reasons on which it is based. "102 
A party taking a decision under Article 10 must ensure that a risk 
assessment pursuant to Article 15 has been carried out.103 The party 
of import may require the exporter either to carry out the risk as-
sessment or, alternatively, to cover the costs of a risk assessment.104 
The risk assessment must be carried out in a "scientifically sound 
manner, in accordance with Annex III, and taking into account rec-
ognized risk assessment techniques. "105 The minimum amount of in-
formation on which a risk assessment can be based is that provided in 
98 I d. Annex l(i). 
99 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, Annex I(m). 
10o ld. art. 9. It is interesting to note that among the information that the acknowl-
edgment of receipt must include is whether to proceed according to the domestic regula-
tory framework of import or according to the AlA procedure as specified in Article I 0. See 
id. art. IO. This presents another opportunity for the scope of the AlA procedure to be 
limited. 
101 !d. art. I 0( 4). 
102 Jd. 
103 Id. art. I5(2). 
104 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. I5(2), (3). 
1°5 !d. art. I5 ( 1). 
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accordance with Article 8, which, in turn, refers to Annex I. Annex 
III, in turn, details the methodology, identifies points to consider 
when carrying out a risk assessment, and states that "[r]isk assessment 
is ... used by competent authorities to make informed decisions re-
garding living modified organisms. "106 Finally, Article 10 ( 6) also 
specifies that: 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant sci-
entific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism 
on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to 
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a de-
cision as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living 
modified organism in question . . . , in order to avoid or 
minimize such potential adverse effects.I07 
The inclusion of a precautionary principle into the Protocol was 
a point of contention, especially between the European Union and 
the United States.108 The precautionary principle is in itself a conten-
tious term. It has been defined in a variety of waysl09 and it is said to 
106 /d. Annex 111(2), (9). 
107 /d. art. 10(6). 
108 Although the Miami Group as a whole also resisted the inclusion of the precaution-
ary principle, at least one member to that group, Australia, presently invokes the precau-
tionary principle in its regulation relating to GMO labeling. See generally Denise M. Lietz, A 
Precautionary Tale: The International Trade Implications of Regulating Genetically Aiodified Foods 
in Australia and New Zealand, 10 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 411 (2001). 
109 James Cameron refers to the debate surrounding the principle's meaning in the 
following way: 
Much of the confusion surrounding the principle's interpretation stems from 
a failure to distinguish between precautionary and preventative measures. 
Preventive standards may be precautionary or non-precautionary in certain 
degrees, but precautionary standards, while able to vary the degree of preven-
tion, cannot be non-preventative. This is because, regardless of the particular 
language used by an instrument, a key element in defining the core of pre-
caution is a lack of certainty about the cause and effect relationships or the 
possible extent of a particular environmental harm. If there is no uncertainty 
about the environmental risks of a situation, then the measure is prewntive, 
not precautionary. In the face of uncertainty, however, the precautionary 
principle, like the Vorsorgeprinzip, allows for the state to act in effort to miti-
gate the risks. Put best, "the precautionary principle stipulates that where the envi-
ronmental risks being run fr; regulatory inaction are in some way uncertain but non-
negligible, regulatory inaction is unjustified." 
James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle in International Law, in TIM O'RIORDAN, JAMES 
CAMERON & ANDREW JORDAN, REINTERPRETING THE PRECAU'IlONARY PRINCIPLE 116 
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occur 111 varying degrees of force, from weak to strong formula-
tions.110 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, cited both in Article 1 and in 
the Preamble of the Protocol, has been catalogued among the weaker 
formulations of the Principle.lll It states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary ap-
proach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent en-
vironmental degradation.112 
Although commentators Cosbey and Burgiel have considered 
Articles 10(6) and 11 (8) as strong formulations of the principle,113 
commentators Cameron and Gupta, offering alternative interpreta-
tions that could place it towards the weaker end of the spectrum, have 
put that contention in doubt. 114 These last authors have brought at-
tention to specific aspects of the language used in these Articles.I 15 
(2001) (emphasis added). Various books and articles haYe been written on the subject of 
the. precautionary principle. Some of these are: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone & Ellen Hey 
eds., 1994); INTERPREllNG THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Timothy O'Riordan & James 
Cameron eds., 1994). 
110 Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contemporary Significance of 
the Precautionmy Principle, in INTERPRETING TilE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 
109, at 12, 20-22; UNITED NA"DONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2001: MAKING NEW TECHNOLOGIES WoRK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CH. 3 MAN-
AGING TilE RISKS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (Box. 3.3) (2001), available at http:// 
www.undp.org/hdr2001/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2003) [hereinafter UN HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT]. 
111 UN HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 110, at 70 (Box. 3.3). 
11 2 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 
47th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 21, at Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) 
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
113 CosnEY & BuRGIEL, supra note 8. 
114 James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle in International Law, in REINTERPRETING 
TilE PRECAU'IlONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 109, at 113, 141; Creating a Global Biosafety Re-
gime, supra note 8, 221-23. Admittedly the precautionary principle as formulated in Arti-
cles 10(6) and 11 (8) could be interpreted as a stronger formulation of the Principle if 
compared to the Rio Declaration Principle 15, because it does not seem to require a threat 
of serious or irreYersible damage, or impose a cost-benefit analysis. See Biosafety Protocol, 
supra note 1, arts. 10(6), 11 (8); Rio Declaration, supra note 112, Principle 15. Additionally, 
it is not contingent on the capabilities of the State. Sec Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, 
arts. 10(6), 11 (8); Rio Declaration, supra note 112, Principle 15. 
115 Cameron, supra note 114, at 141; Creating a Global Biosafety Regime, supra note 8, at 
221-23. 
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For example, the phrasing in Articles 10(6) and 11 (8) refers to in-
sufficient scientific information and knowledge with regard to the ex-
tent of the potential adverse effect.116 This wording may limit the pos-
sibility of basing a decision on this principle to those cases when the 
uncertainty relates to the extent or severity of an adverse effect and 
not when the uncertainty relates to the nature of a possible adverse 
effect.l17 This interpretation is consistent with the Protocol's require-
ment of basing determinations with regard to the import of an LMO 
on a risk assessment.l 18 Under this interpretation, only after a risk as-
sessment has identified a possible risk to biodiversity would reference 
to the precautionary principle be allowed}19 
Other aspects of these Articles are worth pointing out, such as 
the fact that that no specific action, such as a ban, is required except 
that necessary to "avoid or minimize the potential adverse effects. "120 
Articles 10(6) and 11 (8) also use the phrase "taking a decision asap-
propriate. "121 On the aspect of what would be an appropriate measure 
regarding a decision of a party to the Protocol in reference to Articles 
10(6) and 11 (8), reference to Article 16(2) on risk management may 
be necessary. This Article states that: 
Measures based on risk assessment shall be imposed to the 
extent necessary to prevent adverse effects of the living 
modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to 1m-
man health, within the territory of the Party of import.122 
At least one commentator, analyzing the impact the Biosafety Protocol 
may have on trade, has pointed to the use of the word "necessary" in 
this Article as a potential limit on the rights of the party to impose 
certain measures}23 
There are two more articles that have the potential of further 
limiting the use of the AlA procedure. Article 13 establishes a sim-
plified procedure through which an importing party may specify in 
advance to the Biosafety-Clearing-House: (a) that the importing party 
116BiosafetyProtocol, supra note I, arts. I0(6), 11(8). 
117 Id.; Cameron, supra note 114, at I41. 
118 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. I5(2); see also Cameron, supra note 114, at I41. 
119 Cameron, supra note 114, at 141. 
12o Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. I0(6). 
121 See Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 301. 
122 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 16(2). 
123 Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 299; see also infra text accompanying note 276-280. 
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wishes to permit the transboundary movement to it with regard to an 
LMO at the same time the movement is notified (doing away with the 
requirement of prior notification), or (b) that an LMO will be exempt 
from the entire AlA procedure, thus allowing imports of an LMO with 
no further restrictions.l24 Article 14, on the other hand, establishes 
that parties may enter into bilateral, regional, and multilateral agree-
ments and arrangements regarding intentional transboundary move-
ments of LMOs as long as such arrangements do not result in a lower 
level of protection than that provided by the Protocol's procedures.125 
This Article further states that when such an agreement is in place the 
provisions of the Protocol shall not apply.126 
Another obligation which has an impact on the way trade in 
LMOs is carried out is found in Article 18.127 Article 18 requires each 
party to take the necessary measures to make sure that LMOs which 
are subject to intentional transboundary movement are handled, 
packaged, and transported safely.128 The Article also indicates that 
towards this end parties should take into account relevant interna-
tional rules and standards.129 The Protocol then lays out the required 
documentation that should accompany LMOs depending on their 
intended use. 130 
Article 18(2) (a) requires documentation accompanying LMOs 
intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing to indicate 
clearly that it "may contain" LMOs and is not intended for introduc-
tion into the environment. 131 Article 18(2) (b) requires documenta-
tion accompanying LMOs intended for contained use to be identified 
clearly as LMOs and to specify any requirement for their safe han-
dling, storage, transport, and use, and the contact point for further 
information.132 
Although some have suggested that these provisions are some-
how related to consumer choice,133 nothing in the Protocol's Ian-
124 The notification must include the information specified in Annex I. Biosafety Pro-
tocol, supra note 1. art. 13(2-3). 
125 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14 ( 1). 
126 /d.art.14(3). 
12; !d. an. 18. 
128 /d. art. 18(1 ). 
129 !d. arts. 18(1-10). 
130 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 18 (2). 
131 /d. art. 18(2) (a). 
132 /d. art. 18(2) (b). 
133 Sec Badrinarayana, supra note 8, at n. 85. 
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guage suggests that this is an adequate interpretation.134 It seems 
more appropriate, to interpret this provision in light of the objective 
of the Protocol, the protection of biodiversity.135 Indeed, if a particu-
lar LMO is going to be allowed into the country without an AlA be-
cause it is not meant to be introduced into that country's environ-
ment, there must be some way for the importing country to identifY 
said shipments and ensure they are not accidentally or purposely in-
troduced into the environment. Also, there must be a way for that 
country to know what should be done or whom to contact in case of 
an accidental introduction into the environment. 
Article 18(2) (c) requires documentation, accompanying all other 
LMOs falling within the scope of the Protocol, to be identified clearly 
as LMOs; to specifY their identity and relevant traits and/or character-
istics; to specifY any requirements for their safe handling, storage 
transportation, and use; and to identifY a contact point for further 
information.'36 The Article also requires a declaration that the move-
ment is in conformity with the requirements of the Protocol applica-
ble to the exporter.l37 
The last paragraph of Article 18 indicates that the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the Protocol s~all 
consider the need for establishing additional "standards with regards 
to the identification, handling, packaging and transport practices, in 
consultation with other relevant international bodies. "138 This Article 
opens the door for more requirements in these areas but also reflects 
what some commentators have referred to as a determination that will 
allow for market driven requirements to emerge.139 For example, in 
order to appease the Miami Group, the requirement for shipments of 
LMO-FFPs is simply that they are identified with the term "may con-
tain. "140 This decision avoided requiring segregation of non-LMO 
crops from LMO crops, a procedure that the Miami Group qualified 
as impossible or extremely costly.141 Some argue, however, that in-
1!14 Similarly, see Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 8, at 698, stating that "[i] t should 
be noted that these labeling requirements do not concern consumer product labeling but 
shipping documentation only." 
1!15 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1. 
136 !d. art. 18(2) (c). 
137 !d. 
1!18 !d. art. 18(3). 
189 See Rafe Pomerance, The Biosafety Protocol: Cartagena and Beyond, 8 N.Y. U. ENVTL. LJ. 
614,620 (2000). 
140 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 18(2) (a). 
141 See Hagen & Barlow, supra note 8, at 705; Shweizer, supra note 8, at 594. 
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creasing market demands for non-GMO products is, in fact, already 
requiring the segregation so resisted by the exporting countries.l42 
But aside from the AlA procedure, and the limited requirements 
of Article 18, attention must also be given to nvo other aspects of the 
Protocol before concluding a review of its trade-related obligations. It 
is important to note that Article 24 on non-parties does not ban trade 
with non-parties but it does require that the transboundary movement 
benveen parties and non-parties "be consistent with the objectives of 
the Protocol. "143 This Article also states that a party may enter into 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements or other arrange-
ments with non-parties regarding such transboundary movements.144 
This Article could lessen the fear that non-parties would be discrimi-
nated against with regard to trade in LMOs covered by this protocol, 
although it does not limit the rights of a party to demand compliance 
with certain of the Protocol's obligations.l45 
Finally, we must refer to the way in which the Protocol resolved 
the impasse relating to the inclusion of a savings clause. Included in 
the Preamble-and not in the operative language of the protocol-
are the following phrases: 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should 
be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable 
development, 
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as im-
plying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party un-
der any existing international agreements, 
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to sub-
ordinate this Protocol to other international agreements. 146 
Commentators Cosbey and Burgiel described the emergence of this 
preambular trio in the following manner: 
142 Stephen To mans, Pmmise, Peril, Precaution: The Environmental Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL Snm. I87, 203 (2001 ); Thomas P. Redick & 
Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of "Genetic Pollution": Declining a 
Dinner Date with Damoc/es, 30 Emtl. L. Rep. 10328,1 I (2000). 
143 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. 24(1). The fact that the specific obligations of 
the protocol relating to transboundary movements of LMOs are only applicable as be-
tween parties to the protocol is also affirmed by Article 3(k) which states: "Transboundary 
movement" means the movement of a living modified organism from one Party to another 
Party, save that for the purposes of Article 17 and 25 transboundary movement extends to 
mm·ement between Parties and non-Parties."/d. art. 3(k). 
144 !d. art. 24(1). 
145 !d. 
146Jd. pmbl. 
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The Miami Group got what it wanted. The text states that 
"this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change 
in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing in-
ternational agreement." The EU also got what it wanted. The 
next paragraph of text states that, "the above recital is not in-
tended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements." And the Like-Minded Group got what it 
wanted: both statements appear in the preamble, not in the 
main text. It is not clear where this compromise leaves the 
Protocol relative to the Wf0.147 
It is precisely this relation that will be examined in the rest of this 
article. This article will evaluate if it is even necessary to resort to the 
preambular language, by examJning if there is any conflict between 
the rights and obligations of the Biosafety Protocol and the rights and 
obligations of the wro that would require an answer as to the ques-
tion of which treaty prevails. The next section begins by laying out 
what are the rights and obligations of the wro agreements. 
III. WTO AGREEMENTS: THE NEGATIVE OBLIGATIONS 
The WfO is the institutional framework of the international mul-
tilateral trading system.148 Every member of the WfO has entered 
into commitments related to its trade policy regime and measures 
with relation to its trade in goods among other things.l49 The rights 
and obligations of the WfO members can be enforced through a dis-
pute settlement system.t5o 
wro obligations constitute limits, or what has been termed 
"negative obligations," upon its members to refrain from enacting 
certain governmental regulations. The following agreements, and 
their negative obligations, have been selected for review because of 
their potential to conflict with the positive obligations that the Rio-
safety Protocol places upon its parties. 
147 Cos BEY & BuRGIEL, supra note 8. 
148 WTO, World Trade Organization: A Training Package, available at http:/ /www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003). 
149 !d. 
150 !d. 
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A. The GATT 
The GATT covers all international trade in goods.l5t Within the 
WTO, three GATT 1947 "principles" or "disciplines" continue to be 
the framework upon which the ideal of "free trade" is built. These are 
as follows: Article I, prohibiting discrimination between the products 
imported by member states, also referred to as the most favored na-
tion principle; Article III, prohibiting discrimination between im-
ported and domestic goods, also referred to as national treatment; 
and Article XI, prohibiting quantitative restrictions on trade.t52 
Articles I and III embody the principle of non-discrimination 
among "like products. "1 53 Under Article I, like products from differ-
ent countries should receive the same treatment by the importing 
country. Under Article III, like products from foreign member coun-
tries must be treated no differently than the like domestic products. 
Thus, determining if products are alike is central to any claim that 
there has been a violation of these Articles. 
The most recent expression of the Appellate Body with regard to 
like products can be found in European Communities-Measures Affect-
; ng Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Asbestos Case) .154 It stated 
that a finding that two products are alike must be made on a case-by-
case basis155 by examining four general characteristics that the prod-
ucts might share: (1) "the physical properties of the products"; (2) 
"the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or 
similar end-uses"; (3) "the extent to which consumers perceive and 
treat the product as alternative means of performing particular func-
tions in order to satisfY a particular want or demand"; and (4) "the 
international classification of the products for tariff purposes. "1 56 
The Appellate Body, in the Asbestos Case, also rejects the WTO 
Panel's determination that if two products could be used towards the 
same end, their physical properties should be considered equivalent, 
if not identical.157 It further determined that characteristics such as 
151 GATT, supra note 7, art. I; \'lTO, GA.TT and the Goods Council, available at 
http:/ /v.·ww.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/gatt_e.htm (last Yisited Feb. 25, 2003). 
152 GATT, supra note 7, arts. I, II, XI. 
153 /d. arts. I, III. 
154 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures Mfecting As-
bestos and Asbestos-containing Products, WT /DSI35/ AB/R (Mar. I2, 200I ), 40 I.L.M. 
I I 93 (200I ), available at http:/ /www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/ distab_e.htm# 
I 998 [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body Report]. 
155 !d. ~ I 01. 
156Jd. 
157 !d.~ I I2. 
290 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [\'ol. 26:263 
the products' risks to human health should be considered as physical 
properties and may also be considered under the category of con-
sumers' taste and habits.l 58 When examining the third criterion, the 
Appellate Body indicated the importance of determining the extent 
to which consumers would be willing to use the products to perform 
similar end uses.I59 
GAIT's prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports must be read in conjunction with the principle of non-
discrimination and, thus, also requires a determination of like prod-
ucts. It is also of interest to the objective of this article that Article XI, 
although normally referred to as applying to quotas or bans on for-
eign products, at least in one instance has been interpreted broadly 
by the WTO "to apply to any border measure imposing any burden on 
international trade. "160 
A country can, nonetheless, undertake trade measures that result 
in violation of any of these three disciplines if it satisfies the excep-
tions present in Article XX of GATT. Article XX states, in pertinent 
part: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
158 Id. 'l[ll3. In the Asbestos case, the particular health threat was the known carcino-
genic nature of the chrysotile asbestos fibers. Id. '1114. Interestingly, the Appellate Body 
also established that the use of health risks in determining the physical properties of a 
product does not nullify the effect of article XX(b). I d. 'I 113. 
159 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 154, 'I 121. 
160 David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade1: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and En-
vironment Debate, 41 VA.]. INT'L L. 279, 293 (2001) (citing WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 
Report on India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile, and Indus-
trial Products, 1999 WTO DS Lex is 5, para. 5.142 (Apr. 6, 1999)). 
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(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption)61 
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Although these exceptions have been interpreted by a number of 
vVTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions, these exceptions actually 
have never been applied to exempt a member country from its gen-
eral GATf obligations. 162 In both United States-Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline,163 and in United States-Import Prohibi-
tion of Certain Slnimp and Slnimp Products, 164 the WTO Appellate Body 
concluded that there was a distinction between the standards for Arti-
cle XX(b) and XX(g). In what has been termed a more "environmen-
tally friendly reading for Article XX(g),"l 65 the Appellate Body consis-
tently recognized that a measure does not need to be "necessary" to 
be "related to" the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. 166 
It is important to note that "necessary" in Article XX (b) is not a de-
termination of whether protection is necessary, but whether the measure 
is necessary-i.e., are there other less trade-restrictive ways of pursu-
ing the same goal?l67 
But even if a measure is found to satisfy the requirements of ei-
ther Article XX(b) or XX(g), it must still meet the requirements of 
the introductory paragraphs of Article XX. 168 Thus, a measure must 
also meet the requirement of not being an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
nor can it constitute a disguised restriction on trade. 
161 GAIT, supra note 7, art. XX. The phrase "exhaustible natural resources" has been 
interpreted to include dolphins, salmon fisheries and clean air. DAVID HuNTER ET AL., 
IN'H:RNAilONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoUCY 1166 (2002). 
162 See HuNTER ET AL., supra note 161, at 1163-65. Only one wro Panel report actu-
ally determined that a measure that violated GAIT disciplines was permissible under Arti-
cle XX(b), but the WTO Panel decision was reversed by the Appellate Body. See generally 
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 154. 
163 \'\'TO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, Wf/DS2/ AB/R (May 20, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996). 
164 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/ AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999). 
165 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 161, at 1168. 
166 !d. 
167 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM.J. INT'L L. 268,276 (1997). 
168 GAIT, supra note 7, art. XX. 
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B. The TBT Agreement 
There are measures that can also fall into the categories covered 
by another WTO agreement, the TBT. The TBT's purpose is ensuring 
that WTO members do not use technical regulations and standards in 
a way that creates unnecessary obstacles to international trade.169 To 
date, no case has been decided under the TBT. 
The TBT covers all technical regulations, standards, and confor-
mity assessment procedures that may bear npon all imported products 
including "industrial and agricultural products."170A technical regula-
tion is defined by the TBT as: 
[A] [d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or 
their related processes and production methods, including 
the applicable administrative provisions, with which compli-
ance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or produc-
tion method. 171 
The following analysis of the TBT will be limited to the interpretation 
of the obligations imposed as to technical regulations because of their 
pertinence to this article's objective. It is interesting to point out that 
the Appellate Body in the Asbestos Case stated that, contrary to the 
WTO Panel's reasoning, a ban could be a technical regulation falling 
under the scope of the TBT.I72 
Technical regulations are governed primarily by Article 2 of the 
TBT, which establishes the following requirements for member coun-
tries. First, members shall make sure that their technical regulations 
do not result in discriminatory treatment of products imported from 
other member countries, by requiring they be treated no less favora-
bly than like products of domestic origin or from other countries.173 
This obligation is a clear reference back to the already-analyzed re-
quirements of GATT Articles I and III. 
Second, technical regulations should not create unnecessary ob-
stacles to international trade. Towards this end, technical regulations 
169 Kristina Kloiber, Removing Technical Baniers to Trade: The Next Step Toward Freer Trade, 
9 TuL.J. lNT'L & CoMP. L. 511, 517 (2001 ). 
170 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.3. 
171 Id. annex 1 (1). 
172 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 154, 1: 76. 
173 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.1. 
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"shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill [sic] a le-
gitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would 
create. "174 Among the legitimate objectives, the TBT recognizes pro-
tection to human health or safety; protection to animal or plant life or 
health; and protection to the environment. The TBT also describes 
some relevant elements to be considered when assessing the risks that 
non-fulfillment would create. These are: "available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology or intended 
end-uses ofproducts."175 
Third, the TBT requires that technical regulations be eliminated 
if the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no 
longer exist or if an alternative less trade-restrictive measure is pres-
ently available. 176 
These second and third requirements of the TBT are commonly 
referred to as the "necessity test. "177 This test, also present in the SPS, 
has been described as "the means by which an effort is made to bal-
ance between two potentially conflicting priorities: promoting trade 
expansion versus protecting the regulatory rights of governments. "178 
Fourth, the TBT pursues harmonization by requiring that tech-
nical regulations be based on available and relevant standards formu-
lated by an international body unless those standards would be inef-
fective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued .... 179 The TBT defines an "international body" as 
one whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of all mem-
bers.180 
Another significant requirement is that members must consider 
accepting equivalent technical regulations of other members that, 
although different from their own, adequately fulfill the objectives of 
their regulations. 
Finally, it must be noted that the scope of the TBT is also limited 
by its own Article 1.5, which states: "The provisions of this Agreement 
do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined m 
174 /d. art. 2.2. 
175 /d. art. 
176 !d. art. 2.3. 
177 \VTO, !l.pplication of the Necessity Test: Issues for Consideration (Oct. 8, 1999), at http:/ I 
www.wto.org/ english/ tratop_e/ serv _e/ serv_reg_secretariatnot_e.h tm. 
178Jd. 
179 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.4. This article giYes examples of reasons why a 
certain international standard could be ineffectiYe or inappropriate because of "funda-
mental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems." !d. 
180 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, Annex 1 ( 4). 
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Annex 4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures." 
C. The SPS Agreement 
The SPS's stated purpose is to limit the use of SPS measures as 
disguised barriers to trade.181 Three cases have already been resolved 
by the Appellate Body under the SPS: EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Beef Hormones Case) ;182 Australia-Measures Affecting Im-
portation of Salmon (Australian Salmon Case); and183 japan-Measures 
Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan Agticultural Products Case) 184 
Significantly, in each of the cases, the measure has been deemed in-
consistent with the members' SPS obligations. Interestingly, these 
cases all involved disputes between highly developed countries with 
intricate regulatory frameworks and were decided prior to the wro 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle. 
All measures enacted by members of the WfO that come under 
the scope of the SPS must be in accordance with the provisions of the 
Agreement.185 A sanitary or phytosanitary measure is defined in An-
nex A, paragraph 1 of the SPS as any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the terri-
tory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, estab-
lishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organ-
isms or disease-causing organisms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the ter-
ritory of the Member from risks arising from additives, con-
taminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, bev-
erages or feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of 
the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by ani-
1s1 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl. 
182 WfO Appellate Body Report on European Community Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products, Wf /DS26/ AB/R; Wf /DS48/ AB/R (jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef 
Hormones Appellate Body Report]. 
18!1 WfO Appellate Body Report on Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, Wf/DS18/ AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australian Salmon Appellate Body 
Report]. 
184 WfO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, 
Wf /DS76/ AB/R (Feb 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan Agricultural Products Appellate Body 
Report]. 
185 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 1, 'l[ 1. 
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mals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, estab-
lishment or spread of pests; or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of 
the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests. 186 
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According to the SPS, a measure must be applied only to the ex-
tent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. The 
measure should be based on scientific principles and should not be 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.187 An exception to 
this requirement is provided by Article 5, paragraph 7 of the Agree-
ment. In language reminiscent of Article XX of GATT, the Agreement 
requires that SPS measures not discriminate between members 
"where identical or similar conditions prevail including between their 
own territory and that of other Members" and that measures not be 
applied in a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade.t88 
Article 3 of the SPS requires members to base their SPS measures 
on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations where 
they exist. 189 It provides that measures which conform to international 
standards, guidelines, or recommendations will be deemed as neces-
sary and presumed consistent with both the SPS and GATT in gen-
eral,l90 
The international standards are defined in Annex A, paragraph 
3(a), (b), and (c). 191 In matters of food safety, the Agreement refers to 
the work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex).l92 For 
animal health and zoonoses, the Agreement refers to the work of the 
International Office of Epizootics (IOE).193 And finally, for plant 
health, the Agreement refers to the work of the Secretariat of the In-
ternational Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) .194 In the case of mat-
ters not covered by those organizations, the relevant standards can be 
those promulgated by "other relevant international organizations 
186 !d. Annex A, 'l[ I. 
18; !d. art. 2, 1 2. 
188 !d. art. 2, 'l[ 3. 
189 !d. art. 3, 'l[ I. 
190 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3, 'l[ 2. 
191Jd. Annex A, 1 3(a)-(c). 
192 !d. Annex A, 1 3 (a). 
193Jd. Annex A, 1 3(b). 
194 !d. Annex A, 1 3(c). 
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open for membership to all Members, as identified by the Committee 
[on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the Wf0]."195 
Notwithstanding the SPS's aim of harmonization, a member 
country maintains the right to implement SPS measures that are nei-
ther based on, nor exceed, international standards.196 But in these 
cases, the measure must be based on a "scientific justification "197 or 
"as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the rele-
vant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.2. "198 
Article 5, paragraph 1 states: "Members shall ensure that their 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on a risk assessment, as 
appropriate to the circumstances of the risk to human, animal or 
plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations."199 
The SPS provides a list of elements that shall be taken into ac-
count in the process of assessing risks: "available scientific evidence; 
relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; 
existence of pest-or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and en-
vironmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. "2°0 
In the context of risks to human health, the Appellate Body in 
the Beef Hormones Case asserted, regarding this listing: 
Some of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 such as 
"relevant processes and production methods" and "relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods" are not necessar-
ily or wholly susceptible of investigation according to labora-
tory methods of, for example, biochemistry or pharmacol-
ogy. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the 
listing of factors that may be taken into account in a risk as-
sessment of Article 5.2 was intended to be a closed list. It is 
essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated 
in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascer-
195 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, Annex A, ~ 3 (d). 
196 ld. art. 3, 'l[ 3. 
197 !d. In paragraphs 174 to 176 of the Beef Hormones Case the Appellate Body con-
cluded that the disjunctive "or" created a distinction that may be more apparent than real, 
basically equating both requirements as entailing a risk assessment. Beef Hormones Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 182, 1:1: 17 4-76. 
198 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3, ~ 3. 
199 Id. art. 5, 'I 1. 
2°0 ld. art. 5, 'I 2. 
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tainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly con-
trolled conditions, but also risks in human societies as they 
actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse 
effects on human health in the real world where people live 
and work and die.2o1 
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According to the SPS, the risk assessment must identify: (1) a 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within 
a territory or (2) a potential for adverse effects on human or animal 
health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.2o2 
Aside from these indications, the SPS offers little guidance as to 
what constitutes an adequate risk assessment. However, in the Austra-
lian Salmon Case, the Appellate Body established a three-pronged test 
for satisfactory risk assessment in the context of the first part of An-
nex A, paragraph 4, referring to measures designed to protect animal 
life or health from risks arising from pest or disease. The test devel-
oped requires that the risk assessment: 
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread 
a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well as the 
potential biological and economic consequences associated 
with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases; (2) 
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological 
and economic consequences; and (3) evaluate the likelihood 
of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according 
to the SPS measures which might be applied.203 
It is significant to note that in both the Australian Salmon Case and 
the Beef Hormones Case the Appellate Body has insisted that the risk 
assessment need not be carried out by the member adopting the sani-
tary measure and that the SPS measure "might well find its objective 
justification in a risk assessment carried out by another member, or an 
international organization. "204 
A member can establish a "measure" based on the findings of the 
risk assessment. But first, the member must determine the level of 
201 Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, 'I 187. 
202 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, Annex A, 1 4. 
203 Australian Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, 1 121 (emphasis added). 
204 Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, 'I! 190; Australian Salmon 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, 1 122 n.68. 
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protection it desires against the identified risk, and then the measure 
that it chooses in order to achieve the level of protection desired.205 
The Agreement establishes different requirements for each of these 
determinations. With regard to the level of protection, the member 
appears to have significant discretion, but is constrained by at least 
two provisions of the Agreement.2°6 First, Article 5.4 states that mem-
bers should take into account the objective of minimizing negative 
effects on trade when determining the appropriate level of sanitary 
and phytosanitary protection.207 Second, Article 5.5 requires a mem-
ber to be consistent, avoiding arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the levels of sanitary and phytosanitary protection it considers appro-
priate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on trade.2°8 
The measure that a member imposes in order to achieve its de-
sired level of protection is also subject to various requirements aside 
from having to be based on a risk assessment. Article 5.6 requires that 
members ensure that a measure is not more trade-restrictive than re-
quired to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, taking into account the economic and technical feasibility 
2°5 Australian Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, 1[ 200. "The 'appropriate 
level of protection' established by a Member and the 'SPS measure' have to be clearly dis-
tinguished. They are not one and the same thing. The first is an objective, the second is an 
instrument chosen to attain or implement that objective." !d. (referring to Beef Hormones 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, 'I 214). 
206 !d. '1125. In the Australian Sahrton Case the Appellate Body clarified some expres-
sions made by the WTO Panel with regard to a country's determination on level of protec-
tion by stating in 'l[125: 
The statement by the Panel quoted above is not appealed, and we merely 
note that it is important to distinguish-perhaps more carefully than the 
Panel did-between the evaluation of "risk" in a risk assessment and the de-
termination of the appropriate level of protection. As stated in our Report in 
European Communities-Hormones, the "risk" evaluated in a risk assessment 
must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is "not the kind of risk 
which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed. This does not mean, however, that a 
Member cannot determine its own appropriate level of protection to be "zero risk. " 
!d. (emphasis added). 
207 At least one commentator has drawn attention to the fact that the language in this 
article through the use of the word "should" instead of "shall" seems to "denote a lesser 
degree of obligatory force." Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation 
on Trial at the World Trade (hganization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2329, 2356 (2000). 
208 Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, 'I 211. Two of the cases ex-
amined have referred to this last requirement: The Beef Hormones Case at '11 210-46, where 
no violation was found; and the Australian Salmon Case at '11 139-78, where the Appellate 
Body found a violation of Article 5.5. Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 
182, '1'1210-26; Australian Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, '1'1139-78. 
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of the alternatives. Article 4 of the SPS imposes the obligation upon 
WTO members to accept the SPS measures of other members as 
equivalent to their own, if such measures are demonstrated to achieve 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection pursued 
by the importing member's measure. Finally, the Japan Agricultural 
Products Case seems to add an additional requirement with regard to 
the measure and its relationship to the general obligation in Article 
2.2. Seeming to take a stricter stand than that reflected in the Beef 
Honnones Case,209 the Appellate Body determined that, in addition to 
requiring a rational relationship between the measure and the risk 
assessment, there must be a rational or objective relationship between 
the measure and the scientific evidence.210 It is important to note that, 
according to the Appellate Body, all of the requirements mentioned 
in this paragraph are to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Up to this point, we have seen two ways in which a WfO member 
can legitimately establish an SPS measure. The first is by basing its 
measure on an international standard. The second is by basing its 
measure on a risk assessment. But there is a third way in which a party 
can establish a legitimate SPS measure under the agreement, albeit a 
temporary one. Article 5, paragraph 7 states: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information, in-
cluding that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek 
to obtain the additional inform~tion necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time.2II 
In the Beef Hormones Case, the Appellate Body was faced with hav-
ing to determine the relevance of the precautionary principle in the 
context of the SPS.212 The Appellate Body determined that the pre-
cautionary principle was reflected in Article 5. 7, but at the same time 
recognized that there was no need to assume that Article 5. 7 ex-
2iJ9 Sec Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, '1'1 192-94. 
21° Sec japan Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supra note 184, 'I 84. 
211 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 5, 1 7. 
m Beef Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 182, 1'1 120-25. 
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hausted the relevance of the precautionary principle to the SPS. The 
Appellate Body stated: 
We agree, at the same time, with the European Communi-
ties, that there is no need to assume that Article 5. 7 exhausts 
the relevance of a precautionary principle. It is reflected also 
in the sixth paragraph of the preamble and in Article 3.3. 
These explicitly recognize the right of Members to establish 
their own appropriate level of sanitary protection, which 
level may be higher (i.e., more cautious) than that implied 
in existing international standards, guidelines and recom-
mendations. Thirdly, a panel charged with determining, for 
instance, whether "sufficient scientific evidence" exists to 
warrant the maintenance by a Member of a particular SPS 
Measure may, of course and should, bear in mind that re-
sponsible, representative governments commonly act from 
perspectives of prudence and precaution where risk of irre-
versible, e.g. life terminating, damage to human health are 
concerned. 213 
Notwithstanding this explicit recognition of the precautionary princi-
ple as embodied in various provisions of the SPS, the Appellate Body 
was clear in stating that the Principle did not override the provisions 
of Articles 5.1 and 5.2.214 In this context, the Appellate Body seems to 
recognize that a member country may invoke the precautionary prin-
ciple when determining its level of protection, as long as a risk has 
been identified pursuant to Articles 5.1 and 5.2. Furthermore, in the 
context of the japan Agricultural Products Case and its requirement that 
a reasonable link exists between the scientific evidence and the meas-
ure being employed, the apparent inclusion of the precautionary 
principle by the Appellate Body in determining whether "sufficient 
scientific evidence" exists might become increasingly relevant. How-
ever, the most important assertion is the recognition that Article 5.7 
does not exhaust the applicability of the precautionary principle in 
the context of the SPS. 
But when can Article 5.7 be invoked as sufficient ground for a 
measure? In the Japan Agricultural Products Case, the Appellate Body 
described four requirements of a measure under Article 5. 7 that must 
213 /d. 'l! 124. 
214 !d. 'll 125. 
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be met in order to adopt and maintain a provisional SPS measure. 
The Appellate Body stated: 
Pursuant to the first sentence of Article 5.7, a Member may 
provisionally adopt an SPS measure if this measure is: ( 1) 
imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant scientific 
information is insufficient"; and (2) adopted "on the basis of 
available pertinent information." Pursuant to the second 
sentence of Article 5.7, such a provisional measure may not 
be maintained unless the member which adopted the meas-
ure: (1) "seek[s] to obtain the additional information neces-
sary for a more objective assessment of risk"; and (2) "re-
view[s] the ... measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time. "215 
The Appellate Body made the following important comments 
with regard to these requirements. First, it established that the four 
requirements were cumulative in nature; thus, if one of the require-
ments was not met, the measure would be inconsistent with Article 
5.7.216 Second, with regard to the information that a member "shall 
seek to obtain," it was determined that this requirement referred to 
the pursuit of information that would aid in conducting an adequate 
risk assessment. 217 And finally, with regard to what constitutes a rea-
sonable period of time, the Appellate Body found that this determina-
tion has "to be established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the 
specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of obtain-
ing the additional information necessary for the review and the char-
acteristics of the provisional SPS measure. "218 
IV. DETERMINING ScoPE 
An important part of any analysis that aims to identify or resolve 
conflict among international agreements is determining whether the 
subject matter-or more specifically, the scope of the treaties-coin-
cide before further determining if the rights and obligations created 
by the treaties are in any way incompatible. In the context of deter-
mining the existence of a conflict between any MEA and the WTO, 
this analysis is important because it could reveal that there is no 
215 Japan Agricultural Products Appellate Body Report, supm note 184,, 89. 
216 /d. 
217 /d., 92. 
21BJd., 93. 
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shared scope and therefore, no potential for conflict. In the case of 
the Biosafety Protocol and the WfO trade regime, this analysis is par-
ticularly significant because the rights and obligations of the parties 
and the rigors of the disciplines will vary depending on which wro 
subsidiary agreement is used to analyze a measure. 
The first and most obvious distinction between the WfO and the 
Biosafety Protocol is that the former is a trade agreement and the lat-
ter is an environmental agreement. The Protocol requires affirmative 
regulatory action from the parties' governments to ensure that trade 
in LMOs is adequately regulated in order to protect biodiversity. The 
wro requires members to practice restraint from imposing measures 
that will have an impact on the movement of goods from one member 
state to another. 
Another interesting distinction between trade regimes and envi-
ronmental regimes is pointed out by authors Brown and Jackson: 
The environmental culture contrasts sharply with that preva-
lent in the trade field. The environmental community is 
generally an open one that relies on public access to infor-
mation and is accustomed to demanding public participa-
tion (especially by NGOs) in decision-making. Because the 
public views the environment as "their" issue, governments 
in the democratic tradition necessarily operate to varying 
degrees in a transparent fish bowl.219 
By contrast, the trade culture is more closed. Trade matters 
have been viewed by many governments as being within the 
exclusive competence of governments .... The culture sur-
rounding much of trade law, especially negotiations, neither 
promotes public access to information nor invites public 
participation by NGOs and individuals in its processes.220 
Indeed, the WfO's lack of transparency and of public participa-
tion has been a point of constant criticism by many in environmental 
and other fields. This is one of the characteristics of the WfO that was 
at issue in the protests at the 1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle.221 
This lack of transparency and public participation, when coupled with 
219 Weiss &Jackson, supra note 9, at 14. 
220 !d. at 16. 
221 See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and 
the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment Of Trade And Envimnment Matters, 25 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2001). 
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decisions that impact the environment or health measures, lends itself 
to even harsher criticism and public mistrust.222 It is hard to imagine 
that the wro will ignore this criticism, which could undermine the 
credibility and strength of the WTO. These issues should play at least 
a background role in the task of predicting the outcome of future 
conflicts that posit multilateral environmental concerns against "free 
trade." 
Although this distinction of general subject matter is important, 
the fact is that trade and environmental agreements are cognizant of 
the impact of each regime upon the other. This recognition of "inter-
connection "223 is clearly present in both the WTO's and the Biosafety 
Protocol's Preambles.224 This recognized interconnectedness requires 
moving beyond the general distinction between a trade and an envi-
ronmental agreement in order to resolve the question of whether 
these agreements share-at least with regards to some provisions--the 
same scope. 
The Biosafety Protocol's scope-with reference to trade-com-
prises certain LMOs as they are introduced into international trade. 
The one undisputed objective of all measures required under the Pro-
tocol is to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity. As discussed in Part II of this article, whether other 
objectives such as protecting human health or certain socioeconomic 
concerns can also be considered stand-alone objectives of a measure 
under the Protocol is doubtful. Still, this possibility will be considered 
in the analysis that follows. 
The scope of the SPS encompasses a wide array of measures; but 
two factors limit the scope. First, the measures have to have the objec-
tive of protecting either a member's territory, the life or health of an 
animal or plant, or human life or health.225 Second, the SPS limits the 
sources of the threats. For example, the threat to a member's territory 
is limited to having pests enter, establish, or spread. In the case of 
human life or health, the threat must arise either from additives, con-
taminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in foods and bever-
ages; from disease carried by animals, plants, or products thereof; or 
222 See CharnoYitz, supra note 8, at 271. 
22' Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law, 1 YALE 
HuM. Rrs. & DEv. LJ. 85,90 (1998). 
224 See GAIT, supra note 18, pmbl.; Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, pmbl. 
225 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, Annex A, 1 1. 
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from the establishment or spread of pests.226 In the case of animal 
health, the threat must arise from the entry, establishment, or spread 
of pests, disease, disease-carrying organisms, or disease-causing organ-
isms; from additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organ-
isms in foods, beverages, or feedstuff. 227 With regard to plants, the risk 
must also arise from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests, dis-
ease, disease-carrying organisms, or disease-causing organisms.228 This 
list of measures is most appropriately viewed as a closed list given that 
the TBT applies only to measures excluded from this list. 
Technical regulations affecting "[a]ll products, including indus-
trial and agricultural products" fall within the scope of the TBT.229 
Under the TBT there are no further limitations, except that the 
measures must not be SPS measures. All other measures relating to 
traded goods that do not fall into either the TBT or the SPS would fall 
under the scope of GATT and its three disciplines. 
With what WTO agreement does the Biosafety Protocol's scope 
overlap? Let us first examine several examples of measures that could 
be enacted by parties to the Protocol. 
Example 1 
A country, following the AlA procedure, announces its decision 
to ban the seeds of a particular strain of LMO-corn. The measure-a 
product of the Protocol's procedures-will probably set out as its ob-
jective the conservation of biodiversity. Notwithstanding this objective, 
a closer look at the reasons for the ban might reveal that the risk as-
sessment identified a risk that this particular strain of LMO-corn 
would accelerate the process by which certain insects create resistance 
to existing pesticides. This, in turn, could create a pest problem for 
the country, threatening the local crops.230 
This is one of the best examples that could be given to support 
the proposition that measures taken under the Protocol would fall 
226 ld. Thus, for example, threats to human health or life from a pharmaceutical or 
from toxins and contaminants not contained in food, beverages, plants, or animals are not 
included under the scope of the SPS. 
227 ld. 
22s !d. 
229 TBT Agreement, mpra note 19, art. 1.3. 
230 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BT PLANT-PESTICII>ES BIOPESTI-
CIDES REGISTRATION ACTION DoCUMENT§ IID1, 1 1 (recognizing the possibility of certain 
Bt Crops increasing insect resistance to pesticides), available at http:/ /www.epa.gov/ 
oscpmont/sap/2000/october/brad4_ irm.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003). 
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under the scope of the SPS. This measure would seem to fit nicely 
into the definition of an SPS measure under the objective of "protect-
ing plant health" from "pests." But fitting this measure under the 
scope of the SPS would require substituting the country's stated ob-
jective for one which fits the SPS's, ignoring the true purpose of the 
measure as an environmental and ecological one. 
The \VTO Secretariat, in a booklet describing the different Uru-
guay Round Agreements, states that measures for environmental pro-
tection other than those specifically defined in the SPS are not cov-
ered by the agreement and are more appropriately addressed under 
the TBT or Article XX of GATI 1994.231 A review of the examples 
given of measures protecting plants against pests also reveals a more 
direct association between the pest and the measure under the scope 
of the SPS, i.e., the measure's traditional intent is not to let pests that 
may be "hitching a ride" on foreign products into the country.232 
Example 2 
A party to the Protocol bans a particular LMO-cotton crop that is 
found-by a risk assessment-to present a threat to the health of mi-
croorganisms in the soil, such as bacteria and fungi. These microor-
ganisms are not only helpful to the local plant life, but are also in 
themselves valuable for their genetic characteristics and as part of a 
delicate ecosystem.233 
Should a measure banning this particular LMO-cotton with the 
objective of protecting biodiversity be considered an SPS measure? 
One alternative would be to consider it a measure to protect plant 
life, but if the real threat identified in the risk assessment was to the 
microorganism itself, could the microorganism be considered an 
animal as defined in the SPS? The word animal in the SPS is foot-
noted to clarify that it includes fish and wild fauna, but does it include 
microorganisms?234 Finally, from what SPS-recognized threat would 
231 WTO, THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES 4 SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
9 (1998). 
232Jd. at 13-15. The examples gh·en of measures include: "plant ... quarantine"; "regu-
lation on treatment of imported fruit to prevent pests spreading." /d. 
233 See generally Soil Association, Soil Biodiversity: Briefing Paper, (Jan. 2002), at http:// 
www.soilassociation.org/web/sa/saweb.nsf/home/index.html (discussing the importance 
of biodiversity for soil organisms) (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). 
234 It is significant to note that the International Animal Health Code prepared by the 
IOE-referred to in the SPS as the recognized international standard-setting body with 
regard to animal health-applies only to mammals, birds and bees. A separate IOE code 
refers to aquatic animals. See David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the 
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the measure be protecting the microorganism: disease-carrying or-
ganisms, or contaminants and toxins in the microorganism's "food"? 
Example 3 
In compliance with Article 18 of the Protocol, an importing party 
requires that certain documentation accompany shipments of LMOs 
whether they be LMO-FFPs, LMOs for contained use, or LMOs for 
introduction into the environment. 
As stated in Part II of this article, these requirements, which refer 
primarily to information that must accompany the shipments of 
LMOs, are not akin to product labeling requirements. These re-
quirements are limited to that information which an importing party 
would need to know in order to meet the objectives of the Protocol. 
For example, a party would need to know information relating to the 
nature of the product or shipment including whether they are LMOs 
or whether the shipment may contain LMOs. These documents must 
also dictate whether particular precautions should be taken to ensure 
the safe handling and transport of the LMO before it reaches its in-
tended destination, i.e., a supermarket, processing plant, laboratory, 
or farm.235 These requirements could fall under the scope of the TBT 
and its definition of technical regulations described as "administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory, "236 and which in-
clude provisions that deal with the terminology, marking, and labeling 
requirements applicable to products.237 Unless, of course, these re-
quirements form a part of a measure whose objective is covered by the 
SPS. We then return to the debate of examples 1 and 2. Still, in this 
example, there is an additional consideration (that the Protocol does 
not require a particularized risk assessment for these measures) which 
will apply equally to all LMOs according to their intended uses. Ab-
sent this risk assessment, it is less feasible to locate an alternate objec-
tive and threat that will fit the SPS other than the stated objective of 
avoiding "adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. "238 
World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, N.Y.U. J. INT'L & PoL. 865, 892 
(2000). Since none of the IOE standards seem to apply to microorganisms, or insects for 
than matter, a situation like the one mentioned in this example would have no recourse to 
a set international standard. 
235 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, Annex ll. 
236 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, Annex I. 
237 Jd. 
238 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1. 
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These examples illustrate the fact that biosafety matters regard-
ing biodiversity are not part of the affirmed scope of the SPS.239 
Biodiversity is a distinct environmental concern that transcends typi-
cal sanitary and phytosanitary concerns. According to the definition 
of biodiversity in the CBD, this term focuses on the diversity among 
genes, the diversity among and within species, and the diversity 
among and within ecosystems.240 This last concept of ecosystem biodi-
versity is significant because it is not necessarily concerned with quan-
tity, but instead with interconnections. In other words, ecosystem 
biodiversity is not solely centered around the extinction of one ge-
netically unique organism, but around the effects that extinction (or 
increase or decline) of an organism can have on the remaining envi-
ronment. Thus, the question of whether a ban undertaken by a party 
to the Protocol with the objective of conserving biodiversity should be 
considered an SPS measure must be addressed seriously. 
It is unclear how the wro will classify measures whose objective 
is biodiversity conservation. Is the objective of conserving biological 
diversity analogous to protecting human, plant or animal life; or is it 
more akin to the objective of conserving limited natural resources 
(GATT XX(g) ); or is it similar to the objective of protecting the envi-
ronment expressly stated in Article 2.2 of the TBT? 
This analysis does not lead to the conclusion that a ban under the 
Protocol would escape WfO rights and obligations, but it does indi-
cate the need to consider that these measures may be more appropri-
ately situated under the scope of the TBT or the general GATT disci-
plines. The following analysis is necessary in the event that, under an 
alternative interpretation of the Biosafety Protocols' scope, a ban 
could be based on only the objectives of protecting human health or 
protecting certain socioeconomic considerations of developing coun-
tries. 
In the case of a ban based on a human health risk identified by a 
risk assessment, various questions also arise with regard to the scope 
of the SPS. In order to come within the scope of the SPS, the LMO 
itself-or the change introduced by modern biotechnology into an 
239 In fact, whether the SPS is the agreement that applies or should apply to measures 
concerning LMOs in general is also a disputed matter. See Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 276-
77 (citing U.S. Statute, Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, which 
contains a provision in section 409(b) (4) establishing as one of the U.S. objectives in wro 
trade negotiations to affirm that SPS applies to new technology, including biotechnology); 
see also Cors, supra note 8, at 30. 
240 CBD, supra note 2, art. 2. 
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organism-would need to be considered an additive, contaminant, 
toxin, or disease-causing organism. In the BeefHonnones Case, the Ap-
pellate Body seemed to accept that a hormone (be it natural or syn-
thetic) introduced into an animal destined to become food fell into 
one of these categories. But this situation is still distinguishable from a 
determination that an introduced gene can also be considered under 
one of these categories. In a case such as this, in which the clear ob-
jective of a measure is the protection of human health and not the 
conservation of biodiversity, it will be more difficult to argue that such 
a measure does not fall under the scope of SPS disciplines. Still, it is 
important to note that if the risk identified came from the handling 
of, or certain contact with, an LMO not related to its use as feed, bev-
erage, or feedstuff, the measure would not come under the SPS's 
scope. 
A measure that bans an LMO with the objective of preventing an 
adverse socioeconomic impact is clearly not an SPS measure. The pos-
sibility of a measure such as this emerging from the Protocol without 
a prior finding of a threat to biological diversity is improbable.241 Fur-
thermore, the text of the Protocol specifically states that considera-
tion of socioeconomic impacts may be taken into account but only. in 
a manner "consistent with their international obligations. "242 There-
fore, this will definitely not be a situation for which the Biosafety Pro-
tocol could be credited with creating a right or obligation that 
conflicts with its parties' other international obligations.243 
But, given the fact that there are instances in which measures 
taken pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol could arguably come under 
the scope of the SPS or the TBT and GATT disciplines, further analy-
sis is required to identity the possibility of conflict. It is important to 
note that two treaties may share the same scope yet not result in a 
conflict. For a conflict to exist, the rights and obligations of the par-
ties to both international agreements must be in contradiction. In-
deed, in the scenario of a conflict among rights and obligations of the 
parties to both international agreements, the controversial preambu-
lar language requires consideration. 
241 See discussion supra Part II. 
242 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 26. 
243 But see Article 12.4 of the TBT, which appears to provide an alternative to some 
developing countries concerned with the economic dependence that could arise from the 
introduction of certain types of LMOs into their existing agricultural arrangements. TBT 
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 12.4. 
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Before dealing with this scenario, it is helpful to begin with the 
analysis of a situation in which a transboundary movement of LMOs 
will take place between an importing country that is a member of the 
WTO and a party to the Biosafety Protocol, and an exporting country 
that is a member of the WfO but not a party to the protocol. The rea-
sons for beginning with this scenario are twofold. First, the WTO 
rights and obligations of both parties with regard to one another un-
doubtedly remain intact. Thus, if under this analysis there appears to 
be no conflict among the rights and obligations of the agreements, 
the analysis of the same situation but among parties to the Protocol is 
practically unnecessary and is an interpretation of the preambular 
language. Second, this scenario is most likely to give rise to a confron-
tation, given the fact that many LMO exporting countries seem reluc-
tant to sign or ratifY the Protocol. 
V. CoMPARING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AMONG MEMBERS 
OF THE Wf0, ONE OF WHICH IS NOT A PARTY TO 
THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL 
The only obligation that affects trade in LMOs between parties to 
the Protocol and non-parties is that transboundary movement among 
the two be conducted in accordance with the objective of the Proto-
col, as stated in Article 24.244 Complying with the Article 1 objec-
tives245 would mean establishing a set of measures that would ensure 
an adequate level of protection to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity from adverse effects resulting from the introduc-
tion of LMOs into the environment of the importing country, in ac-
cordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration. The Protocol provides ample room for negoti-
ating an agreement between a party and a non-party that would satisfY 
both sides and thus, avoid any confrontation under the Wf0.246 But, 
not withstanding this situation, it would also be possible for an im-
porting country to determine that the simplest way to ensure compli-
ance with the objectives of the Protocol is to conform all trans-
boundary movement of LMOs to the Biosafety Protocol's specific pro-
244 Article 24 (I) of the Protocol, referring to non-parties, states: "Transboundary 
mowments of Ii\·ing modified organisms between Parties and non-Parties shall be consis-
tent with the objecti\·e of this Protocol. The Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and 
multilateral agreements and arrangements with non-Parties regarding such transboundary 
moYemen ts." Biosafety Protocol, supm note I, art. 24 (I). 
245 Sec supra text accompanying note 12. 
246 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, art. 24 (I). 
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visions.247 As an importing country, this could mean that the party to 
the Protocol may require both parties and non-parties: ( 1) to con-
form to the provisions on notification and approval prior to a trans-
boundary movement; (2) to prohibit the entrance of a certain LMO 
under Article 10; and (3) to establish measures to comply with Article 
18 on identification of imported LMOs. These examples adequately 
represent the range of measures that could require analysis under the 
wro disciplines. 
A. Requi1ing an AlA 
The AlA procedure is a requirement that previous authorization 
be obtained from the importing party prior to the export of certain 
LMOs. As detailed in Part II of this article, the AlA procedure pro-
vides certain time constraints in order to reduce the effects such a 
measure could have on trade. The procedure, as set out in the Proto-
col, is also restricted to the first introduction of any particular LMO 
into the importing country, which further limits its effect on trade. 
The AlA procedure is also similar to the prior informed consent pro-
cedure found in other environmental treaties. It is significant that this 
procedure has not found its way into the ongoing debate of MEA 
measures and their compatibility with trade disciplines. 
Nevertheless, at least one commentator has suggested that the 
AlA procedure itself might be subject to wro discipline, particularly 
the SPS. Still, most commentators simply do not consider the AlA. 
procedure to be worrisome with regards to wro trade disciplines.248 
One of them suggests that this type of measure would not be subject 
to the same rigors as other more trade-restrictive measures.249 
It is interesting to note that the SPS itself asserts in the last para-
graph of Annex C ( 1): 
247 It would be hard for a party to argue that compliance with the specific provisions of 
the Protocol is the only way to comply with the Protocol's objective because this interpreta-
tion would render Article 24, an operative provision of the Protocol, superfluous. In fact, 
the recognition of alternative ways of achieving the objectives of the protocol can be found 
in various provisions of the Protocol allowing parties to agree to or inform that an alterna-
tive procedure than that provided by the protocol will be used. See id. arts. 2(4), 9(2) (c), 
9(3), 11(4), 13, 14. 
248 Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 37. 
249 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 8, at 712 (pointing out that she had found no 
evidence that the negotiating parties to the Protocol expressed any concern that the AlA 
procedure as such was wro inconsistent). 
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V\rhere an importing Member operates a system for the ap-
proval of the use of food additives or for the establishment 
of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages or feed 
stuffs which prohibits or restricts access to its domestic mar-
ket for products based on the absence of an approval, the 
importing Member shall consider the use of a relevant in-
ternational standard as the basis for access until a final de-
termination is made.250 
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This provision would seem to recognize, albeit in the context of food, 
beverages, or feed stuffs, the right of member countries to establish 
mechanisms such as the AlA before reaching a final determination on 
the product's entry. Significantly, the Article merely suggests that a 
member could consider referring to relevant international standards 
as a basis for access while the final determination is being made. 
This analysis leads me to conclude that the AlA procedure should 
more adequately be considered as the background procedure upon 
which certain measures are taken. This is not to say that the proce-
dure could not be abused and lead, for example, to a de facto ban of 
certain LMOs. But this sort of situation would not be created as a re-
sult of the obligations imposed by the Biosafety Protocol on its parties 
and thus, any violation of WfO disciplines would not be the result of 
a conflict between the Protocol's rights and obligations and those of 
the WTO. 
B. Imposing a Ban on an LMO 
The second measure to be analyzed is a determination, by a party 
to the Protocol, to prohibit or ban a certain LMO from being im-
ported. It is important to remember the following aspects of a ban 
pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol: first, that a ban, although permit-
ted by the Protocol, is not specifically required; second, that any de-
termination regarding the import of an LMO, including a ban, must 
be preceded by a risk assessment carried out in a scientifically sound 
manner;251 third, that a determination to ban a product must set out 
the reasons on which this decision is based;252 fourth, that although a 
ban could be a result of the application of the precautionary princi-
ple, as established in Article 10(8), this Article requires a prior deter-
25° Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, Annex C(l). 
251 !d. art. 10(1). 15(1). 
252 /d. art. 10(4). 
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ruination of a potential adverse effect; finally, that the measure ban-
ning a LMO must also be consistent with Article 16(2) of the Protocol 
which states that such measures should be applied to the extent nec-
essary to prevent adverse effects on biodiversity. 
This article will first discuss a ban under the more rigorous SPS 
discipline. Although, as was indicated previously, scope must be care-
fully contemplated before reaching the conclusion that any measure 
under the Biosafety Protocol should be considered as falling under 
the scope of the SPS. 
1. A Ban and SPS Disciplines 
The simplest and most desirable way of ensuring compliance with 
the SPS disciplines is to compel a member to base its measure on in-
ternational standards. Thus, if the banning of a certain LMO was 
based on an international standard, guideline, or reconunendation, 
no incompatibility should exist between the ban and the SPS obliga-
tions. However, in the case of the SPS, only three international or-
ganizations have been recognized as providers of standards: the Co-
dex, the IOE, and the IPPC.253 The Codex establishes standards with 
relation to the quality and safety of food. 254 The IOE establishes 
veterinary regulations designed to prevent the spread of transmissible 
diseases to animals and to human beings.255 The IPPC aims to provide 
standards for measures to protect plant resources from harmful 
pests.256 Commentator Cors, citing documentation prepared by the 
BSWG, has pointed out that none of these organizations have specific 
coverage of biosafety concerns and their dealings with LMOs is, at 
best, incidental to their objectives.257 If WTO members are intent on 
253 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 12(3). 
254 It is interesting to note that with regard to food derived from biotechnology, a task 
force of the Codex has recently agreed on a final draft of principles for the risk analysis of 
foods derived from biotechnology. The agreement is also said to mark a breakthrough in 
international negotiations concerning the use of tracing systems in relation to food in 
international trade. Joint Press Release, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Codex Task Force Agrees on Final Draft of Principles for the Evaluation of GM Foods (Mar. 
8, 2002), available at http:/ /www.fao.org/WAICENT /OIS/PRESS_NE/ english/2002/3060-
en.html. 
255 See Office International des Epizooties, To Guarantee the Sanitary Safety of World Trade 
l!y Developing Sanitary Rules for International Trade in Animals and 1\nimal Products (last up-
dated Apr. 22, 2002), at http:/ /~w.oie.in t/ eng/ OlE/ en_securite.h tm. 
256 See International Plant Protection Convention, Apr. 3, 1952, 23 U.S.T. 2767, 150 
U.N.T.S. 67, art. 1, 'l[ 1 (as amended Nov. 17, 1997) [hereinafter IPPC]. 
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dealing with Biosafety measures under the SPS, it might be wise for 
the SPS Committee to recognize the Biosafety Protocol as the stan-
dard-setting body in this area. Still, given that the SPS Committee's 
determinations require consensus,258 and given the controversies sur-
rounding trade in LMOs, it is difficult to envision the United States 
allowing for such consensus to form. 
Moreover, at least one of these organizations, the IPPC, has been 
actively coordinating its work with the Convention of Biodiversity and, 
in particular, with the Biosafety Protocol,259 Thus, another possibility 
is that, to the degree in which these organizations could overlap with 
the Protocol, their standards will reflect those considered appropriate 
by the Protocol. Such organization could, in some circumstances, jus-
tit)· measures taken pursuant to the Protocol based on the recognized 
international standards. 
In the short run, however, if a party to the Protocol establishes a 
ban, it would likely need to satisfy the requirements of Article 3.3 of 
the SPS which, as was discussed previously, requires compliance with 
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 on risk assessment. 260 With regard to risk assess-
ment, the strictest requirements appear to accompany risks from pests 
or disease that can affect plants or animals. Thus, this article will ana-
lyze the ban under these requirements, as stated in the Australian 
Salmon Case. 261 The requirements for a risk assessment under this case 
find their equivalents in the risk assessment procedure of the Protocol 
as laid out by its Annex III. For example, Annex III requires: (1) 
"identification of any novel genotypic and phenotypic characteristics 
associated with the living modified organism that may have adverse 
257 Cors, supra note 8, at 34-35. This limited scope of the international organizations 
referred to in the SPS could also be significant in the analysis about scope carried out in 
Part IV of this article. 
258 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 12.1. 
259 See Food & Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO), FAO Helping the Consumer 
and Protecting the Environment Through Food Quality Control and Plant Protection: Codex Alimen-
tarius/ Intemationa/ Plant Protection Convention, at http:/ /www.fao.org/WorldFoodSummit/ 
sidee\·ents/papers/ffi823e.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2003) ("Many components of the 
IPPC are directly related to elements of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and 
the Cartagena Protocol, including work on invasive species and genetically modified or-
ganisms. A~ a consequence, the CBD and IPPC are establishing a dose collaborative rela-
tionship to ensure consistency."); see also International Centre for Trade & Sustainable 
De,·elopment (ICTSD), FAO Plant Health Commission to Build B1idges Between WTO and CBO, 
ICTSD BRmGES: Wn:KI.Y TRADE Nr.ws DIGEST, Apr. 10, 2001, at http:/ /www.ictsd.org/ 
html/weekly I I 0-04-01 I story5.h tm (last visited Apr. 18, 2003). 
260 SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3.3. 
261 Sec supra text accompanying note 203. 
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effects on biological diversity in the likely potential recetvmg envi-
ronment";262 (2) "evaluation of the likelihood of these adverse effects 
being realized, taking into account the level and kind of exposure of 
the likely potential receiving environment to the living modified or-
ganism";263 (3) "evaluation of the consequences should these adverse 
effects be realized";264 and (4) "recommendation as to whether or not 
the risks are acceptable or manageable, including, where necessary, 
identification of strategies to manage these risks. "265 
Thus, it would be difficult to argue that a risk assessment carried 
out pursuant to the Biosafety Protocol would not satisfY the require-
ments of an "adequate" risk assessment by the SPS. Once the risk as-
sessment procedure has determined the likelihood of a risk, then the 
importing country must determine its adequate level of protection 
and it may determine, pursuanno the precautionary approach, that it 
should set its level of protection at "zero risk. "266 This result would not 
violate any of the party's obligations under the SPS. The importing 
party can prohibit the import of a particular LMO in order to achieve 
its desired level of protection. The measure, in this case the ban, 
would need to comply with the party's other SPS obligations. Such 
obligations include not being more trade restrictive than necessary-
taking into account the technical and economic feasibility of the alter-
natives-and accepting other members' measures as equivalent. 
Again, there appears to be no evident conflict between these obliga-
tions and those of the Protocol, if the desired level of protection is 
met. 
Still, absent adequate information on which to base a risk assess-
ment, a determination to ban might also be a result of a country want-
ing to extend protection of biodiversity beyond what is specified in 
the Protocol. This action, although recognized as a right under Arti-
cle 2(4) of the Protocol, is restricted by this same Article to actions 
consistent with the party's other obligations under international law. 
Thus, the importing party, which under this scenario is also a member 
of the WTO, could exercise its right under Article 5. 7 of the SPS in 
order to ban a product when relevant scientific information is in-
sufficient to carry out a proper risk assessment. 
262 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, Annex 111(8) (a). 
263 Id. Annex 111(8) (b). 
264 !d. Annex 111(8) (c). 
265 Id. Annex 111(8) (e). 
266 See supra note 206. 
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In this case, once more, no conflict would arise between the im-
porting party's rights and obligations under the Protocol and its obli-
gations under the SPS. A ban imposed pursuant to Article 5. 7 would 
need to satisfY the requirements of this Article as expressly laid out in 
the japan Ag;ticultural Products Case.267 With regard to these require-
ments, one commentator has stated: 
To adopt such a provisional measure, a Member has the ob-
ligation to seek additional information and to review the 
measure within a reasonable period of time. The latter re-
quirement leaves much room for interpretation. In the 
young field of biotechnology, the "reasonableness" of dura-
tion should be longer than in the context of older methods 
and technologies where long term effects are better 
known.268 
Due to the fact that some cases of present and future LMOs could 
conceivably lack sufficient scientific information on which to base an 
adequate risk assessment, this Article could be useful. 
The second scenario that will be examined is the compatibility of 
a ban of an LMO pursuant to the Protocol with the obligations of the 
TBT. 
2. A Ban and TBT Disciplines 
The TBT also pursues the goal of harmonization through the use 
of relevant international standards, but unlike the SPS, it does not 
provide for any particular international organization as the recog-
nised standard-setting body in any field. Thus, a ban established pur-
suant to the procedures set out in the Protocol possibly could benefit 
from the presumption in Article 2.5 of the TBT that it is not an un-
necessary obstacle to international trade. Different from the case un-
der the SPS, the only apparent requisite for an international organiza-
tion or agreement to be considered a standard-setting body is that its 
membership be open to the relevant bodies of all WTO members.269 
Therefore, there appears to be no impediment, under the TBT, for 
the Biosafety Protocol to become the standard-setting body with re-
gards to technical regulations referring to LMOs that may have an 
impact on biodiversity. 
267 Sec supra text accompanying note 215. 
~66 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, mpra note 8, at 720. 
269 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, Annex I (4). 
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Aside from this possibility, a ban pursuant to the Protocol simply 
would not appear to conflict with any of the obligations of the TBT. 
First, the ban's objective would probably best be catalogued as that of 
protection of the environment, an objective expressly recognized in 
TBT's Article 2.2. Nevertheless, the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity, an objective not only of the Protocol but also present 
in the CBD-which actually has more parties than the vVTO-could 
also be considered a separate legitimate objective in the open ended 
listing of the TBT. Second, the risk assessment procedure provided in 
the Protocol would, in all probability, be considered adequate under 
the TBT. The TBT has very few indications as to what needs to be 
considered in an adequate risk assessment; but, for example, two of its 
mentioned considerations, scientific information and a products' end uses, 
are integral parts of the Protocol's risk assessment.270 
Still, particular attention should be given to the requirement in 
Article 2.1 with regard to like products. As Parts I and II of this article 
demonstrate, the first major obstacle the Biosafety Protocol faced was 
certain countries objecting to distinguishing LMOs from other organ-
isms modified through more traditional methods. This debate, al-
though arguably resolved with the approval of the Biosafety Protocol, 
could potentially resurface in the context of the WTO. 
The Asbestos Case requires examination of four characteristics of 
the product to determine if two products are alike in the context of 
the WTO non-discrimination disciplines. 271 At least two of these char-
acteristics could strongly support a finding that they are not alike. The 
first characteristic is the physical properties of the products. In the 
case of most LMOs, it is precisely a change in a physical property that 
is purposely created to make the product more attractive to certain 
needs of farmers or consumers. Additionally, the fact that, for exam-
ple, both an LMO cotton seed and its non-LMO counterpart can be 
used for the same end-uses has been termed irrelevant in the analysis 
of this first criterion by the Asbestos Case.272 The Appellate Body also 
determined that health risks related to the physical properties of the 
product were appropriately considered under this criterion. Arguably, 
the same could be said about environmental risks. Thus, it would be 
difficult to imagine an LMO that would not be considered as distin-
guishable from its non-LMO counterparts based on its physical prop-
270 Biosafety Protocol, supra note I, Annex 3. 
271 See supra text accompanying note 156. 
272 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 154, 'l[23. 
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erties. The second characteristic is the characteristic of consumer 
tastes and habits; this characteristic could be particularly significant in 
the case of LMOs in that they have created such a polemic among 
consumers. In most cases, an analysis of this criterion should also 
render sufficient reason not to consider the products alike. 
The TBT would also require that a ban be eliminated if the cir-
cumstances or objectives that gave rise to its adoption no longer ex-
isted. Again, this obligation does not conflict with a party's obligations 
under the Protocol. In fact Article 12 (2) of the Protocol specifically 
provides for the review of decisions, such as a ban of an LMO, in light 
of additional relevant scientific information that had not previously 
been considered in the risk assessment, or due to a change in the cir-
cmnstances, that led to the imposition of such a measure. Finally, and 
as was the case with a similar requirement by the SPS, the require-
ment that equivalent measures by other members be considered as 
sufficient, if adequate to meet the desired level of protection, is not in 
conflict with any Protocol obligation. 
Lastly, this article will examine the possibility that a ban may be 
considered under the general GATT discipline. 
3. A Ban and GATT Disciplines 
None of the obligations of the Biosafety Protocol require a party 
to establish measures that discriminate among local and foreign 
LMOs or LMOs exported by different countries. Thus, again, there is 
no conflict between the Article I and Article III obligations of an im-
porting party and the obligations under the Protocol of such parties. 
But even if the ban were considered a violation of Article XI, 
which prohibits quantitative restrictions to trade, it could likely find 
refuge under Article XX(g). In this hypothetical situation, a ban has 
been placed on a specific LMO after a risk assessment had identified 
the likelihood of it having an adverse effect on the conservation or 
sustainable use of biodiversity. Therefore, the ban is a measure "re-
lated to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. "273 Admit-
tedly, fitting a ban, pursuant to the Protocol, under the exception of 
Article XX(g), would require interpreting biodiversity as an exhausti-
ble resource. The WTO has already determined that dolphins, salmon 
and clean air are examples of natural resources. 274 These determina-
tions, coupled with the fact that there exists an international recogni-
m GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(g). 
274 See supra note 161. 
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tion by the CBD that biodiversity is an exhaustible resource (hence 
the need to conserve it), make it difficult to imagine the vVTO reach-
ing any other conclusion. Still, after fitting under the exception of 
Article XX(g), a party to the Protocol (who is a member of the vVTO) 
is still under the obligation of the "Chapeau" to ensure that its meas-
ure is not an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, nor that it constitutes a dis-
guised restriction on trade.275 Commentators Gaston and Abate have 
provided a persuasive analysis of why a determination to implement a 
ban, or any other measure, pursuant to the Protocol would satisfY 
these obligations. Regarding the obligation against arbitrary and un-
justifiable discrimination, they have signaled various Protocol provi-
sions that guard against it. For example, Articles 24 and 14 of the Pro-
tocol guard against the possibility of a party to the Protocol 
establishing an agreement with less restrictive terms towards one 
country, and more restrictive terms towards another. 276 Furthermore, 
there are various provisions throughout the AlA procedure277, and in 
the Clearing-House mechanism, that provide transparency to all 
measures instituted pursuant to the Protocol, and guard against a de-
termination that any such measure is arbitrary.278 
The Biosafety Protocol also guards against "disguising restrictions 
on trade" by requiring the disclosure of information regarding the 
importing party's laws, regulations, and decisions relating to its im-
ports ofLMOs, to exporting countries through the Biosafety Clearing-
House.279 Gaston and Abate state, provided countries adopt measures 
pursuant to the Protocol, the Clearing-House mechanism-and the 
requirement that all measures necessitate prior risk assessment, as 
275 GATI, surpra note 7, art. XX. 
276 Gaston & Abate, supra note 8, at 145. 
277 Gaston & Abate state: 
[T]he Biosafety Protocol, through its AlA process, not only requires 
notification from the exporting countries of certain LMO transactions, but 
also requires "acknowledgement of receipt of notification" from the import-
ing country. Moreover, the Biosafety Protocol establishes a "decision proce-
dure," which lays out a structure for accepting or denying imports. Once a 
decision is made, or anytime thereafter, an importing country may change its 
decision "in light of new scientific information on potential adverse effects on 
... biodiversity" and an exporting country may, at any time, request that the 
importer review its prior decision. 
!d. at 146. 
278 !d. at 145-46. 
279 Biosafety Protocol, supra note 1, art. 20. 
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well as the required notification to the exporting country of the rea-
sons behind a decision-make it hard to argue that the Protocol would 
allow disguised restrictions on trade.2so 
Based on this analysis, it is again difficult to find that a conflict 
exists between the rights and obligations of the GATT and those of 
the Biosafety Protocol. 
C. Handling, Transport, Packaging, and Identification Requirements 
Per the analysis conducted in Part IV of this article, it is hard to 
envision the measures required under Article 18 of the Protocol as 
coming within the scope of the SPS. Still these requirements do seem 
to fall comfortably within the scope of the TBT. As discussed previ-
ously, there would seem to be no obstacles for the requirements of 
Article 18, and any subsequent standards agreed to by the "COP serv-
ing as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol," to become the ap-
plicable international standard with regard to the handling, transport, 
packaging, and identification requirements of transboundary move-
ments of LMOs. The possibility of conflict with TBT obligations would 
therefore be substantially reduced. Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
requirements of Article 18-as they were discussed in Part 11-reflect 
that they are directly related to the objectives of the Protocol, which, 
as stated before, should be considered a legitimate objective under 
the TBT. 
VI. CoNFLICT BETWEEN MEMBERS oF THE V\'TO BoTH oF WHICH ARE 
PARTIES TO THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties281 (VCLT) states, 
(in Article 30 paragraph 3) with regard to successive treaties relating 
to the same subject matter, that " [ w] hen all the parties to the earlier 
treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation under Article 59, the earlier 
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with 
those of the latter treaty." 
Regarding the interpretation of this Article Professor David 
V\'irth has stated: 
280 Gaston & Abate, supra note 8, 147-48. 
281 Vienna C01wention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 81 
I.L.~f. 679. 
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In other words, the obligations in international agreements 
ought to be harmonized where possible to give effect to all 
commitments simultaneously, an approach that counsels 
reconciling agreements with each other whenever possible. 
The obligations stemming from multiple agreements among 
the same Parties ought to be interpreted against the back-
ground of a presumption that gives life to them all, except to 
the extent that, in the words of the Vienna Convention, 
those obligations are not "compatible" with each other.282 
The previous sections have exposed a true lack of incompatibility 
among the rights and obligations of the Biosafety Protocol and the 
WTO regime. Thus, there would seem to be no need to resort to the 
specific instructions of Article 30 of the VCLT with regard to conflict. 
It could also be considered unnecessary to refer to the preambular 
phrases of the Biosafety Protocol to resolve a conflict that does not 
exist. 
Most preambles are a restatement of the intentions of the parties 
who have agreed to a particular operative text, and constitute the con-
text in which an agreement should be interpreted. It is in this sense 
that the three controversial phrases should be analyzed. However, one 
commentator has argued for a weightier reading of the preamble in-
dicating that the preamble is in effect calling off the effects of Article 
30 ofthe VCLT and referring to Article 31.3. He states: 
These two statements appear to cancel one another out to 
some degree. The matter may be resolved with reference to 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 30 on 
the application of successive treaties relating to the same 
subject matter, would not seem to apply in the light of the 
Preamble which clearly intends both agreements to be re-
garded on the same level; neither is intended to be superior 
to the other. Thus, the applicable rule of interpretation 
would be Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention, which pro-
vides that "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with 
the context, any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions. "283 
282 Wirth, supra note 21, at 242. 
283 Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 36. 
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This interpretation is necessary for the commentator because he finds 
that the approach required by the precautionary principle in the Pro-
tocol is incompatible with SPS's interpreted in the Beef Hormones Case. 
Interestingly, through this interpretation of the preambular language, 
he arrives at the conclusion that the precautionary principle included 
in the protocol is supplementing the requirements of the SPS. Cosbey 
& Burgiel reach a similar conclusion but they do not seem to identifY 
a conflict to begin with. 284 They interpret that all rights and obliga-
tions of the SPS are in force against a party of the Protocol and that 
various prmisions of the Protocol simply "fill in some of the gaps of 
the SPS Agreement. "285 This interpretation, they believe, "gives real 
meaning to the preambular recognition that trade and environment 
agreements should be mutually supportive."286 
In fact, it is in tune with this last interpretation that true meaning 
can be given to the controversial phrases. They are the manifestation 
of a desire to harmonize and a call to give life to all the agreements. 
The previous interpretations of the Protocol and the WTO Agree-
ments manage just that. Therefore, it no longer seems like a contra-
diction to state that the Protocol: recognizes that trade and environ-
mental agreements should be mutually supportive; emphasizes that 
the Agreement should not be interpreted as changing the rights and 
obligations of the parties under other international agreements; and 
understands that the veracity of the previous statements in no way 
subordinates the Protocol to existing international agreements. 
CoNCLUSION 
The Protocol's negotiators were primarily concerned with filling 
in regulatory gaps in international law that could allow for biodiver-
sity-related biosafety preoccupations to remain unattended. The 
BSWG's documentation reflects the fact that the interaction and over-
lapping of the Protocol's scope with other existing international obli-
gations was constantly being avoided.287 It is also of importance to 
note that the drhing forces behind much of the negotiations were 
284 CosBF.Y & BuRGIF.L, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
285 !d. 
286Jd. 
2Bi Sec, e.g., Documento de Antecedentes sobre Acuerdos lnternacionales Existentes 
sobre Seguridad de Ia Biotecnologia (re\·isi6n del documento UNEP/CBD/BSWG/2/3) 
(Background Documc11t 011 Existing International Agreements Related to Biosafety (revision of 
UNEP/CBD/BSWG/2/3)), UNEP/CBD/BSWG/3/In£.2 (june 28, 1997). 
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developing countries. This fact is relevant because traditionally, de-
veloping countries have been suspicious of environmental measures, 
viewing them as a way of limiting their developmental possibilities and 
their products' market access. Thus, it seems consistent that an envi-
ronmental treaty pushed forward by concerns from developing coun-
tries would not substantially alter aspects of the existing trade regime 
which could benefit them. 
The 1996 CTE report approved by the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference, as summarized by Charnovitz, included the following 
recommendations with regards to the relationship between MEAs and 
theWTO: 
1. The CTE endorses and supports multilateral solutions 
based on international co-operation and consensus as the 
best and most effective way for governments to tackle envi-
ronmental problems of a transboundary or global nature. 
2. Due respect must be afforded to both WTO Agreements 
and MEAs. 
3. Adequate international co-operation provisions, including 
among them financial and technological transfers and ca-
pacity building, as part of a policy package in MEAs are im-
portant to facilitate the ability of governments, particularly 
of developing countries, to become parties to an MEA .... 
4. Trade measures based on specifically agreed-upon provi-
sions can also be needed in certain cases to achieve the envi-
ronmental objectives of an MEA, particularly where trade is re-
lated directly to the source of an environmental pmblem. They have 
played an important role in some MEAs in the past, and they 
may be needed to play a similarly important role in certain 
cases in the future.2ss 
It would seem clear that, consistent with these few recommenda-
tions that have emerged from the CTE, the Biosafety Protocol is an 
example of a treaty that has aimed to create an environmental agree-
ment that is cognizant and supportive of existing trade obligations. 
Under these circumstances, it truly would be surprising if the WTO, 
through its Appellate Panel, were to interpret that a measure required 
by the Protocol violates WTO disciplines. 
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The truth is that it is also highly speculative and premature to 
predict how the vVTO will deal with products of modern biotechnol-
ogy. The LMO or GMO issues are highly divisive and involve con-
cerns, which the vVTO is not yet equipped to handle, such as ethical 
and moral concerns and consumer interests. This uncertainty could, 
in part, explain why the United States has yet to pursue an action in 
the vVTO against members, such as the European Union, which are 
enforcing strict restrictions on the trade of LMOs and LMO products. 
Finally, although the Biosafety Protocol may not be the treaty that 
will pit MEAs against the WfO regime, the value of this debate is not 
necessarily diminished. Any proposal that attempts to make the WfO 
more MEA-friendly could be beneficial. Particularly because it would 
prevent the "chilling effect" this type of debate could have on the ad-
vancement of multilateral environmental agreements. 
